Brooklyn's Beat

In the NBA, every single decision a team makes cannot be evaluated without context. How close are you to title contention? If you’re a 50 win team, it makes sense to dip into your future to maximize your present. The calculus changes for a 30 or 15 win team. What is your asset situation? If you are asset heavy, focus on what the trade market may bring, and rely on the draft. If not, you should be more locked into free agency as a tool to add talent.  What is your cap situation? If you’re over the cap, it makes sense to keep your talent to whom you have bird rights, because you can’t replace that talent with free agents? If you have cap room, letting those deals roll off the books to create more may be the right play.

I said it at the time, and it bears repeating. The Nets made a huge mistake in 2014 when they let Paul Pierce go. At the time they had an asset picture as follows:

-A team that finished the prior year 34-13, won a tough round 1 series against a very good team, and competed well against the East champs. Was the team great? No. But it was very good, or at least good. It was also good the year prior.

-A team without first round picks in 2014, 2016, or 2018, pick swaps in 2015 and 2017, and no second round pick until 2018. With that, you simply cannot draft the type of high upside young talent that can turn a franchise through the draft — you just don’t have the high picks or volume of picks necessary.

-You do not have tradeable assets.

-You do have a significant amount of cap space in 2016.

Yes, the 2014 Nets were not sincere championship contenders. But, bereft of picks and assets, the highest probability method of reaching that level was simple: win as much as possible, get to the summer of 2016, and use your cap space to sell free agents on being the pieces who can take a good team (or even a decent one), and help it take that next step, to being great. Therefore, the goal for the Nets should have been simple: win as much as possible, tread water, and get to 2016 with a product players want to join.

How do you do that? Recent free agency history shows us that players, on the aggregate, put winning above all else (other than money, but for solid free agents, money isn’t a determining factor because everyone is offering it). They do not make decisions based on buildings, markets, practice facilities, history, or the other factors many love to cite in free agent decisions.

LeBron’s choices in 2010 and 2014? Dwight saying later Los Angeles Lakers? CP3 choosing a once destitute franchise? Greg Monroe and LaMarcus Aldridge choosing Milwaukee and San Antonio? These are decisions based on roster attraction.

Nevertheless, rather than keep Pierce and continuing to compete (which leads to veteran signings that add to the roster), the Nets let him walk, and then it became a snowball effect. Jason Kidd was depicted as the bad guy, but did he leave because he saw this coming? The Nets could not replace Pierce with their lack of assets or cap space. They made few notable additions since, and have largely downgraded their talent.  They made no attempt to keep Alan Anderson and Mirza Teletovic, replacing them with Wayne Ellington and Andrea Bargnani — both were spun as cheaper versions of the former, but it’s clear they’re cheaper for a reason. Andray Blatche was bid farewell (Shaun Livingston left of his own accord due to CBA salary restrictions so I will not bring that issue up). There is no capable center behind Lopez.

The results of the carnage of the roster? The Nets are definitely not a decent or good team. Rather, they are well on their way to a 55-65 loss season. It is going to be an uphill battle next summer for the Nets to seal the deal with any notable free agents, a battle that would have been easier had the Nets continued to spend to win.  There is no way that this situation is better than the situation the Nets were in, in 2014.

And while the Nets have publicly pitched what has occurred as a youth movement, is that really what this is about? Getting younger? This is about dollars and cents and saving money.

Salaries in the NBA go up with service time. Young is cheap. And the Nets have gotten younger to get cheaper. If the Nets are all about getting younger, why did they trade all those first round picks just one year prior! That does not compute. Why did they trade a second round pick just to dump Marquis Teague? The sales pitch there was the acquired trade exception, but it expired — so much for that. Why did they dump Jorge Gutierrez AND a second round pick, for quickly waived Brandon Davies? Again, the pitch there was a trade exception, but that expires if not used by December 11 — I’ll hold my breath.

And is this a “youth movement” just because the Nets’ average age is lower. Let’s take a look at some of the young cores around the league, from teams choosing to build via youth movement:

-Utah Jazz: Gordon Hayward, Rudy Gobert, Derrick Favors

-Orlando Magic: Nikola Vucevic, Tobias Harris, Victor Oladipo, Elfrid Payton, a full complement of picks.

-Minnesota Timberwolves: Karl Anthony Towns, Andrew Wiggins, Ricky Rubio, Zach LaVine, a near full complement of picks.

-Philadelphia 76ers: Nerlens Noel, Jahlil Okafor, more than a full complement of picks.

-Brooklyn Nets: Bojan Bogdanovic, Rondae Hollis-Jefferson, Markel Brown, Thomas Robinson/Shane Larkin, no controlled pick until 2019.

Youth movements are built around high upside youth; multiple players who can develop into stars, from whom you except to see exponential leaps in development. The Nets youth simply does not compare to that of other teams, and cannot, given their lack of future picks.  Rebuilding without lottery picks is not a better situation than continuing to compete and selling free agents on that vision — it is only cheaper. 

As for those who feel the roster’s bright spots could not be here if the Nets continued trying to win, that’s false. Rondae Hollis-Jefferson was acquired for Plumlee — that could have been done with Pierce around, and he would have fit very well with the smallball lineups the Nets were employing. Bogdanovic was signed with a cap exception, while Pierce would have been resigned through Bird Rights – independent moves, not one of which the other would have precluded. Markel was drafted before Pierce was let go. The Nets still could have dealt Garnett for Thad if they wanted, and the other youth Brooklyn has is table scraps, capable of being snatched.

So what are the Nets left with? A youth movement, really more akin to a money saving movement for a man with $13 billion to his name. I do not know all of you reading personally, but I will assume you are not making what he is making. Perhaps you spend money on gear or tickets, or time watching games.  And yet your team’s owner took a course that is not in the team’s best interests, because it lightens his balance sheet.

The Nets were not in a great place in 2014. They had an old roster. They did not have draft picks to provide much in the way of youthful reinforcement. They were unlikely to ever be better than in 2013-2014, as players were going to continue to age. But they were in a decent position to position themselves as an attractive place for free agents in 2016.  Hit the market with a decent or good team, a team that has been relatively competitive for 4 years? There are worse situations to join, that’s for sure.

Like the situation you can join now.

From the moment Mikhail Prokhorov bought the Nets, it was clear that the Nets were dead set on entering Brooklyn with a bang, for better or worse.  The moment they drafted Derrick Favors, they looked to trade him because he wasn’t John Wall. The moment they got Deron Williams, they did anything they could to make the face of Brooklyn (don’t watch Blazers games this year).

The fateful Boston trade?  On one hand, it’s easy to throw all the blame on Deron Williams and say that if he performed, the 2013-2014 Nets could have contended.  On the other, looking at his physical decline since that season in light of the Nets’ superb medical staff begs the question: did the Nets make that trade, while fully aware Deron’s body was destroyed, just to brand Brooklyn, build buzz, sell tickets, and steal Knick fans? (As I have stated, if you have Utah’s Deron, the Boston trade is defensible, but with the current iteration, the trade is an atrocity)

Just look at Prokhorov’s retroactive justification of the trade: “I think we did a very good deal, and it was a great investment in the Brooklyn brand . . . it was very important to invest some money . . .  in Brooklyn Nets brand . . . I think my investment’s minimum five, six times now more than I spent. So I have a nice get.”

That quote is clear – the Nets made the big Boston trade to brand Brooklyn in year 2. They did not worry about collateral fall out. And for all the murmurs that marketing and winning are not mutually exclusive because marketing is eased by winning, that is not the case. Sometimes, the pursuit of building a winner necessitates unpopular moves, nondescript moves, and taking what the fanbase wants and saying “too bad. We won’t do that.”  And that is why there must be a distinct split between an organization’s basketball side and business side.

The Nets have moved past the Boston trade, and now say that they are done making splashes.  On a superficial review, you can make a case for that.  Just three of their 17 players are 30 or above; four when Bargnani turns 30 tomorrow.  They did not make any further dips into the future to maximize the present.  They say they are not worried about where the pick they send to Boston falls.  There were no glitzy Borough Hall pressers, standing room only conferences for hires of former franchise greats, or the like.

The Nets, on the surface, appeared to operate with one goal: positioning themselves for the future when they cannot compete in the present.

But have they truly left behind their philosophy of making a splash to sell people on Brooklyn?  After all, it’s easy to proclaim that you did not make a splash and behaved normally in the offseason, when you had no options to do otherwise.  The Nets had no cap space this summer, and could not trade any first round draft pick before 2020 given the Stepien Rule.  It’s difficult to make a splash when, quite literally, you do not have the assets (money to spend or future assets to trade) to make one.

And while their offseason is being spun as the end of splash making, to what extent was the Nets cutting back a product of that, as opposed to Prokhorov simply saying, “I’m tired of spending all of this money to be a running joke, all for a mediocre product.”

After all, the Nets former head coach, Avery Johnson, used to say that for the Nets, it was about winning an NBA championship, not a local championship (over the Knicks).  But after barely making the playoffs, the Nets triumphantly made a point of noting that they were the only New York team standing. They also implied that they look to time their success such that they win when the Knicks are losing.

Yes, the Nets can say they’re no longer about splashes and PR. But, paradoxically, to what extent is saying “we are done making splashes” a splash in and of itself — the Nets know that their eye popping moves of 2012-2014 put them in their hole, and that the public wants to hear that they are prepared to act rationally.  Is that why they are feeding them that the days of indulgence are over?

The Nets also say they are now all about youth, given the amount of under 30’s on the roster.  But the 2011 Nets were young, too, and that changed quickly.  Are the Nets committed to youth and patience, or did they become young because Prokhorov wants to spend less (perhaps to defray his current costs, but also perhaps he is looking to buy Ratner’s share to facilitate a sale as it is easier to sell a whole entity than a piece), and given salaries spike as players age, young means cheap?

The evidence that the Nets are still concerned with marketing endeavors at the expense of their basketball program is out there. And the Zach Lowe line in this piece that the Nets may be more concerned with optics than sound management is damning.

It is true that one can see why NBA teams — not just the Nets — often choose to “make a splash” over building the patient way, and it happens around the league (albeit the Nets are perhaps the worst culprit).  NBA teams are at their cores, businesses, and the goal of any business is to make money.  So teams, frankly, will sometimes make moves that are to a degree, suboptimal, in order to cultivate and maintain fan interest and belief (as opposed to simply deciding what is the best move to make in the pursuit of a title, and making it).

The Toronto Raptors signed Anthony Bennett.  Was he truly the top free agent on their board. Or, with their roster close to full, was this signing them saying, “whatever, this is a bench spot, let’s sign a local kid to get Canadians interested in the team.”  Did the Lakers believe Byron Scott was the best coach out there? Or, with Kobe aging and Dwight Howard leaving and the once great Lakers crumbling, did they hire a former Laker of the glory days to sell the Laker way as alive and well?

You see these types of moves when teams dump players or coaches to resolve “personality conflicts” as well. The Bulls fired Tom Thibodeau: what did he do wrong?  Was the firing as simple as ownership saying “a title is a long shot anyway. I’m not going to work with guys I don’t like? And to what extent was the Kings firing Mike Malone a product of similar logic.

Teams will never say so publicly, but surely will argue that it is necessary to make splashes, and make moves with a marketing basis in mind.  After all, they will argue that if you are oblivious to the business side in making moves, that you will wind up like the Sixers, whose relentless commitment to patience has led to on point criticism like this.  Surely, organizations making a splash will argue that in a league where it is so difficult to win a championship, that it is better to have a 1.7% chance at a title and fans buzzing about your splashes than a 2.4% chance and no fan enthusiasm. They will also argue that all teams, even the good ones, make splashes, but that only those who lose are called out for them. The Warriors firing Mark Jackson and publicly eviscerating him after the fact as impossible to work with — that was a splash. And…crickets.

And when people say things like, “the Spurs don’t make splashes,” the retort will be something along the lines of, “it’s easy to do that when you luck into Tim Duncan.”

But when teams make moves with marketing purposes in mind, what they forget is that no temporary boost off a move rooted in building ticket sales is going to make a franchise persistently popular.  One one thing will cause that — persistent winning.  And in a league where it is so DIFFICULT (emphasis necessary) to win an NBA championship and to build a perennial winner, you only make that job more difficult when you focus on the wrong criteria in making your moves.  If you begin making moves with the logic of “we need to sell tickets,” or “we can’t suck this year because the Knicks will be good” or “we are going to get ripped by the media if we lose this year,” you are only taking this difficulty, and adding to it.  It’s hard enough to win when you do everything right.

So, are the Nets done making splashes and ready to build like a normal franchise? They say they are. And maybe it’s true. But we cannot answer that question right now.  If they strike out on Durant and other elite 2016 targets, will they be deliberate, or overpay just to say “we got somebody to put on a billboard and get season ticket holders”!  If they can mortgage a few youngsters into a decent regular in 2016-2017 to avoid missing the playoffs in a season where the Knicks may project to make them, will they resist the temptation if it’s the wrong move? Will they focus on signing the right names, even if they are not “big” names, or focus their efforts on names with cache for the general public? With the Mets Rangers and Jets thriving, the Islanders and Knicks trending upward, and the Giants and Yankees having established pedigrees, will the Nets feel they have to make a move to be relevant next summer? Time will tell; the Nets are currently saying the right things but healthy skepticism is warranted.

Sadly, the Nets face a season where there is not much to learn.  Can Lopez continue to stay healthy? Can any of their young faces become rotation players? Can Bogdanovic take a developmental leap? Can Lopez and Young defend together when it matters in future seasons? Little else is at issue in what is likely a lottery, or at best “make the playoffs and get torched round 1” type of season on the horizon.

Where we will really learn about the Nets, however, is when Mikhail Prokhorov and Billy King get another war chest to play with in eight months.

According to Tim Bontemps of the New York Post, the Nets signed Andrea Bargnani today.  The deal is for the veteran’s minimum with a year two player option (for those wondering why all these minimum deals are two year pacts: it gives you early bird rights. When the Nets were able if they wanted to give Blatche 4-$25, but not Livingston, it was because Livingston did not sign for a second year).

One thing must be said regarding this signing: Bargnani’s career is in a tailspin.  He has not had a generally healthy year since 2010-2011, missing 31-53 games per year each season since.  His defense is brutal. And last season’s 36.6% from 3 (which is decent, but not exactly “stretch 4” caliber) was his best shooting season since 2009-2010.  He was an embarrassment with the Knicks after a disappointing tenure as a hopeful leader in Toronto.

That all said, the signing may work out, under one guise.  Once a player earns a certain opinion (for better or worse), that opinion tends to stick with the player.  Deron Williams earned a franchise player reputation and was given the benefit of the doubt of a potential resurgence for years, and even to an extent now.  Josh Smith and Lance Stephenson are viewed as overpaid cancers, and neither seems able to shake it — Stephenson was traded for Spencer Hawes’ epically bad contract in a deal that the Hornets were praised for; Smith was a huge asset to a western conference finalist and cannot get anyone to give him a contract this summer.

Here is the thing: just because a player was something, does not mean he IS something. And just because a player was overpaid, does not mean he is overpaid.

Bargnani was a problem in Toronto because he was supposed to become a franchise player, and instead became a drain on the franchise.  In New York, he was a problem because he made $11,500,000 last season, and was acquired for a first round pick in the belief he could be a nice sidekick for Carmelo Anthony.

Bargnani woefully failed in the missions of becoming a franchise player, and earning 8 figures as a player acquired for a first rounder.  However, Bargnani does not have to do either in Brooklyn.  Brook Lopez and Thaddeus Young will start, and all Bargnani has to do is provide capable reserve minutes when either player is sitting.

If he can shoot decently from the three point line, and even play bad defense (his defense is normally atrocious, and the Nets cannot afford that, but even bad defense will do), he will be worth his minimum contract.  If he does not, the Nets will go to other options on their benches.

Essentially, just because Bargnani failed to meet the expectations set for him in Toronto (be a franchise player) and New York (be an $11 million player worth dealing a first rounder for), does not mean he cannot be worth $1.4 million as a bench player.  Similarly, just because Josh Smith was not worth a $56 million contract from Detroit, did not mean he was not worth $2.1 million to play a reserve role in Detroit.  Bargnani will always be an epic draft bust.  A player who two teams regretted ever having.  But the Nets are not asking Bargnani to do the things those teams needed from Bargnani.

It is true that Bargnani has struggled shooting (which is awful for a stretch 4), cannot defend a chair, has questionable desire, and Deron Williams is his version of ironman.  But given what’s left on the free agency market, and the tiny salary commitment (the tiniest possible), the move is certainly understandable.  It can be so easy to view a player from one prism, and never change the prism.  The Nets signed a player to a minimum salary to fight for minutes off the bench today: view him from that prism, and forget about his former expectations.  I will not hold my breath, but there is a chance the move pans out.

With That, What Happens to the Rest of the Roster

The Nets have 18 players, and you can only carry 20 preseason, and 15 during the season.  At least three players on the team now cannot be on it in November.  Here are some thoughts on what may happen with the rest of the roster:

–Steve Blake is likely on the move: Most teams carry three point guards and the Nets have 4, 5 if you include Markel getting minutes at the position.  Blake is the obvious odd man out.  Jack is Lionel Hollins’ presumptive starter, and the Nets want to give some developmental time to Larkin and Boatwright.  Making just $2.1 million and an expiring, Blake is easy to move.  The Nets could send him to a team with cap space, or deal him for nonguaranteed contracts.

–Earl Clark is a likely casualty: Clark seems to be the most obvious numbers game victim of the nonguaranteed contracts. Markel is going nowhere. Boatwright and Reed were just added. Jefferson showed flashes last season.

-Can Cory Jefferson fetch a future asset: Jefferson may be next to go.  The Nets have loaded up front with 4’s despite having Jefferson, and he fell out of the rotation.  Unlike Clark, Jefferson may have a drop of trade value; perhaps the Nets can flip him for a future second rounder rather than simply cutting him.

-Brooklyn may not be done: The Nets still may see if any free agents entice them.  At this point, the only obvious thing to acquire is another traditional center behind Lopez, however.

In a big piece of news, David Aldridge of NBA.com broke a huge story on Friday.  The Nets negotiated a buyout of Deron Williams’ contract.  With the buyout, Deron will make $5.5 million per season from the Nets from now through the 2019-2010 season, while playing elsewhere.  The move made absolute sense for Brooklyn.

As an aside, in analyzing the move, I will not be looking at the luxury tax implications for the Nets.  As far as I am concerned, whether this move saved the Nets $61 million next season (which it did), didn’t save a penny, or saw the Nets lose money, I believe the move was smart, relative to where the Nets are on the arc of contention in light of their cap situation.  In addition, in analyzing the move, I am doing so without considering what could have been had the Nets cut the chord earlier (i.e.: the Lin-Asik rumors, the Deron-Plumlee to SAC rumors).  I am analyzing the move under the following hypothetical: what should one have done as Nets GM assuming he was hired in in June, 2015 when this offseason began.

Explaining the Move

Coming into this offseason, the Nets knew they would not have any cap space to upgrade the roster this summer. By resigning Brook Lopez and Thaddeus Young, the Nets had a near $100 million payroll, with the cap at $70 million: adding key talent this summer is, and always was, not an option.

With that, the goal for the Nets always should have been clear: build, or start building, a legitimate contender in 2016.  There was no way to do that this summer, not with no cap space, no lottery picks, AND no assets that could fetch foundational players in trades. In that regard, once the Nets resigned Lopez and Young (which was smart, they are not superstars but are good to very good players that can be part of a very nice core), they were looking at the following salaries on their books going into 2016 (with their draft picks signed at 120% of the rookie scale, as they have been):
-Lopez: $21,165,675                                         -Young: $12,078,652
-Bogdanovic: $3,573,020                               -Hollis-Jefferson: $1,395,600
-McCullough: $1,191,480                               -Deron: $22,131,135
-Jack: $500,000 of his $6,300,000 is guaranteed even if the Nets dumped him
–TOTAL: $62,035,562. With a projected $89,000,000 salary cap that would yield $26,964,438 in cap space to build around the above players. While Larkin, Ellington, and Robinson have small player options in the $1 million to $1.5 million range, players at that level most typically opt out and all 3 player options would only add about $4.1 million to the payroll, if exercised.

Those numbers make it clear: regarding building in 2016 and beyond, Deron was the only bad contract on the roster. Other players on the roster are either paid reasonably in 2016-2017, or are overpaid but expire after the 2015-2016 season: if there was a player to move to boost the team’s chances in 2016-2017, Deron was that player.  

$26,964,438 may sound like a lot of cap space, but it is not the type of space that one would think at first blush.  A max contract with the cap at $89 million ranges from $22,25-$31.15 million, depending on the player’s service time.  And look at some of the contracts that went out this summer.  As a sampling of the market across positions, Brandon Knight, Wesley Matthews, DeMarre Carroll, Khris Middleton, Greg Monroe, and Robin Lopez all got between $13.5 and $17.5 million per season. All are good players. None are very good, great, or anything close to foundational.  Yet a player of that caliber would have absorbed most of Brooklyn’s cap space.

With Deron waived? Now, the Nets have an additional $16,631,135 in cap space in the summer of 2016, for a prospective total of $43,595,573 in space (pending the 3 above player options).  The value of that prospective space is simply too good to pass up for Deron’s production.

It is true that dumping Deron hurts the 2015 Nets on court product.  From a pure production perspective, ignoring salaries, expectations, or assets traded to get a player and make him happy, Deron was the best point guard on the Nets in 2014-2015, and figured to be so in 2015-2016.  He is a smarter player than Jack, a better passer, and a player who produced more than Jack, in terms of on court-off court numbers.

However, the reality of the situation is the Nets had a point guard who essentially averaged 13 and 6 on 38% shooting, was trending downwards, and who was sucking up $22 million plus in  cap space going forward.  The ability to wash 75.2% of that figure off the cap had to be taken.  Realistically, how many wins next season did dumping Deron cost the Nets: five? Five wins next season are worth nothing compared to an extra $16,631,135 in cap space, and all the avenues that can open.

It is true that opening up all this extra cap space is by no means a flawless plan, and maybe not even a good one: but it is the best plan available.  There are only 3 ways to get players: free agency, and the draft and via trade.  The draft? The Nets do not pick in 2016 and 2018, and swap picks with Boston in 2017: that means no lottery picks for four years unless the Celtics miss the 2017 playoffs.  The trade market?  The Nets do not have an asset worth trading a star player for. The teams vying for Kevin Love were rumored to have offered Klay Thompson or Andrew Wiggins last summer.  The Nets young pieces are nice high character pieces, but none have the projected developmental arc of the youth that typically gets dealt for star talent.

That leaves free agency – a place where everyone’s money is equally green – as the Nets best chance of doing something dramatic.  Sure, there are factors that will weigh decisively against Brooklyn on the market.  Over the past several years (although for whatever reason, it has only become a media topic this year), good players have showed that in free agency, their priority is to join other good players so they can win…not to go to a “big market.”  LaMarcus Aldridge and Greg Monroe spurned Los Angeles and New York for San Antonio and Milwaukee.  The Lakers and Knicks had a hard time getting players to take their money, and resorted to plan B’s when they could not nail stars.  San Antonio and Cleveland signed the two best free agents: neither screams “stars flock to big markets.”  And in 2016 as is always the case, there will be more teams with money to spend than players worth spending it on.

But the chance a star (or a group of good players) take the Nets’ free agency money is better than the chance of drafting such players without lottery picks, or trading for such players without the assets to actually do so.  A mediocre plan (which free agency is) beats a hopeless plan.  And the Nets do have one advantage over the Knicks and Lakers: they should be better next year than those teams were last year.

The Nets still have Lopez, Young, Johnson, and Bogdanovic.  Add Hollis-Jefferson, Jack, Brown, Ellington, and their depth at point guard, and while the Nets are certainly not a title contender, the team should have a chance to compete for a playoff spot in the eastern conference. 30-40 wins seem reasonable, and to a free agent, there is a big difference between joining a team that wins 35 games, and a team that wins 15-25.  A 15-25 win team: how can you see the vision of what it can become. A 35 win team in the east? It is not hard to feel that you can help that near contention in the east team take that next step, and that you can do that by joining the core.  It is not hard to see the Nets bigs and wings and feel you can be the guard to take it to the next level.

Why the Counterarguments to the Move Don’t Make Sense

Perhaps the Nets could have said “let’s wait for next summer to execute a buyout.” That would have enabled the Nets to benefit from Deron’s play in 2015-2016, all the while procuring the benefits of taking his 2016-2017 money off the payroll.

But that is a huge risk.  What if Deron enjoyed this season in Brooklyn?  Times change and people change; Deron after all once chose Brooklyn over Dallas, and Aldridge went from wanting to be a Blazer for life to meeting with every team under the sun in an effort to leave.  Deron may have decided after 2015-2016 that he enjoyed his year enough that the $22,131,135 player option in his lap (which the Nets had no power to stop him from exercising) was too sweet to pass up.  The buyout could not be done without Deron’s willingness, and if the Nets waited a year to do it, that willingness may have disappeared.  Billy King and Mark Cuban will not admit it, but Dallas may not have seen Deron as an option next summer the way they do now, reeling from DeAndre Jordan’s about face.   This was a perfect storm and the Nets had to strike when the iron was hot. The result: only slightly (in all likelihood) worsening this year’s team to open up their future cap sheet for free agency, was a very good one, and foregoing it to attempt to secure a great result in 12 months would have been a huge risk not worth taking.

Perhaps the Nets could have said “let’s try to trade him for value”; it surely bothers some that the Nets have literally gotten nothing for Deron.  But in a basketball world built around a salary cap, nothing is better than a net negative.  Nobody wanted Deron Williams. The Nets were not going to be able to trade him without taking dead money in return, or potentially dealing more young pieces just to entice a taker.  Suppose a deal like the rumored Sacramento Kings deal of December (subbing Hollis-Jefferson in for Plumlee) was on the table as the best offer the Nets could take — it is unlikely they could have done anything better.  The Nets would have been forced to add dead money to their future payroll in Jason Thompson, semi dead money in Darren Collison (an upper class reserve point guard and not much else), and all the while would have done this while losing a potential future core piece.  That is less advantageous than having more future flexibility, and that represents a best case scenario type of deal.  In all likelihood, the only available deals to Brooklyn, if any, featured them swallowing dead money and dumping assets to dump Deron: what they did beats that.

Another school of thought was that if Deron was unhappy, the Nets should have made him suffer by forcing him to stay with the team.  That type of vindictiveness is a waste.  Like any other transaction, in handling Deron, the Nets needed to ask themselves one question: what is best for the Nets?  If it was best for the Nets to give Deron a paid vacation at the resort of his dreams and a spot on the Warriors where he could win a title, that would be the call to make.  If it was best for the Nets to send Deron to the Sixers with the requirement that he must listen to a Paul Pierce Deron diss track on a daily basis, that would be the call to make.  The Nets need to do for the Nets, regardless of what that means for Deron Williams.  Not cut their nose to spite their face by defiantly saying “he’s not happy let him rot”!

SO WHAT IS NEXT IN BROOKLYN

The short answer? Scouring the free agent market for value additions (particularly at center), and seeing what they can fetch on the trade market for Blake, as their nonguaranteed contracts (which are their easiest pieces to move, from the pieces which make sense to move).

At this point, it comes down to edgework in building the Nets roster, which for 2015-2016 is largely built.  The Nets have 17 players; 12 guaranteed and 5 nonguaranteed (you get to carry 20 during the offseason, but must trim to 15 by opening night, so decisions will be made), with a depth chart as follows (their lone unsigned free agent is Jerome Jordan, so they do have a decision to make as to him):

1: Jack, Blake, Larkin, Boatwright (non-gtd)
2: Bogdanovic, Markel (non-gtd), Karasev
3: Joe, RHJ, Ellington
4: Thad, Robinson, Reed (non-gtd), Clark (non-gtd), McCullough
5: Brook, Jefferson (non-gtd)

The Nets could see what they can add on the free agency market, but would only have the minimum to spend. They should not spend beyond the minimum, because if they spend more than $3.4 million and dip into the non-taxpayer midlevel exception (and in Larkin and Ellington, they used $3 million already) they will become hard capped at $88.7 million, which would limit the Nets when constructing deals that may arise during the year.

The Nets could explore what a minimum salary would get them, and could add up to 3 players. Jeff Withey is a physical center, and his former Pelicans have paid numerous other bigs this summer. Ekpe Udoh was once a lottery pick. Darrell Arthur is still out there.  The Wizards restocked their wings and Rasual Butler may be obtainable (and can shoot the ball). Henry Sims is a reserve big that can score. Chuck Hayes is a bruiser inside.

Other than that, the Nets can explore the trade market, although their options will be limited.  For starters, Willie Reed, Ryan Boatright, Shane Larkin, Thomas Robinson, and Wayne Ellington cannot be dealt preseason.  Markel Brown, Rondae Hollis-Jefferson, Chris McCullough, Bojan Bogdanovic, Brook Lopez, and Thaddeus Young are seen as core or potential core pieces.

That leaves trades involving Cory Jefferson, Earl Clark, Joe Johnson, Jarrett Jack, Steve Blake, and Sergey Karasev for exploration.  Jefferson and Clark on nonguaranteed deals are readily movable.  If neither figures to make the roster (they could be the two pieces being cut), it may be worthwhile to turn either into a reserve center or future second round pick.

Karasev has little value given his knee injury. Regarding Johnson, with the Nets having avoided the tax, there is no reason to trade him unless they get a better player or mid first rounder.  It seems unlikely a team would give the Nets $25 million in better talent, or a pick that high.

That leaves Jack and Blake, given the glut of point guards and goal of getting playing time for Larkin and Boatwright.  Coach Hollins has taken a liking to Jack, but Jack almost netted a first round pick swap last year, and perhaps a similar deal is available next season.  Blake is a heady, high character player who can shoot the ball, but has lost a step, and at 35 going on 36, clearly is not factoring into the team’s future plans.  And as he is making just $2.17 million, Blake is readily movable. With multiple point guards, the Nets could ship him out of town for a nonguaranteed contract to open flexibility to add a center, or a second rounder.

Times are changing for the Nets.  Deron Williams is finally gone, and in one year, the Nets will have something they have not had since his the end of the Dwightmare: options.

With the additions of Rondae Hollis-Jefferson, Chris McCullough, and Steve Blake, and reports of Brook Lopez and Thaddeus Young returning, the Nets salary picture has changed heading into free agency.  Can they sign any free agents?  What is their 2016 cap picture looking like?  Here is the situation in brief.

The Nets have 8 players under guaranteed contract, with Deron, Joe, Jack, Bojan, Karasev, Blake, McCullough, and Hollis-Jefferson (the picks will sign under the rookie scale in July).  They have four nonguaranteed contracts in Markel, Jefferson, Clark, and Morris.  They then have five free agents in Brook, Thad, Mirza, Anderson, and Jordan.

If you conservatively assume the rookies sign at 100% of the rookie scale (you must sign at 80%-120% of the scale; most teams give players the full 120%), the two rookies would combine to make $2,063,100, bringing the Nets’ guaranteed contract total to $61,496,578, again for 8 guaranteed deals.

According to the great Adrian Wojnarowski of Yahoo! Sports, the Nets seek to resign Brook and Thad and are frontrunners to do so, with figures reaching 3 years, $60 million and 4 years, $48 million respectively.  Free agents being signed with bird rights are entitled to 7.5% raises each season: Thad and Brook are unlikely to receive an identical $12 and $20 million per year respectively, but are likely to see their salaries increase over time (i.e.: start under $12 and $20 million, but finish over those amounts).

Assuming those contracts and raises, suppose Thad makes $10,635,387 next season, and Brook  $18,463,037.  That raises the Nets’ salaries to a guaranteed $90,595,002 for 10 players, and $3,891,323 for their four nonguaranteed contracts.

With the luxury tax at $81.6 million, the apron, or hard cap for any team using the full midlevel exception, is $85.6 million – the Nets will be hard pressed to fit their roster in that hard cap.  Accordingly, the Nets will likely have access to one mini midlevel exception, but not the full midlevel.

Alas, the Nets should forego the use of both exceptions. History shows that the players who sign for these cap exceptions are largely reserves on 2-4 year deals.  A representative sample of players on midlevel money from last summer (ignoring Paul Pierce taking less to win and Shaun Livingston being discounted due to his injury history): Josh McRoberts, Spencer Hawes, Caron Butler, Chris Kaman, Darren Collison, Trevor Booker, Marion Chalmers, Nick Young, PJ Tucker, Vince Carter, and Patty Mills.  With the mini midlevel bringing players proportionally worse, are any of these players worth eating cap room in 2016, just to have now? That is doubtful, especially when players of this caliber will be available in 2016.

The Nets’ 2016 cap space represents a sincere chance to remake the roster.  Why cut into the amount of money to spend, with players of this tier?  Oodles of them will be free agents next summer; just grab them then.

The Nets need to be very mindful of the books: they’re filling up quicker than you think. As of now, if Brook and Thad resign at the above scales, the picks sign on the above scales (a conservative number), and Deron opts in (he’s going to) the Nets have about $60,015,451 on the 2016-2017 books (I added $500,000 for Jack’s guarantee that year and assumed he’d be waived: that guarantee is on the 2016 books unless he is traded), with a cap of $89 million, and roster of six players: Deron, Brook, Thad, Bojan, Hollis-Jefferson, and McCullough.

That leaves for a lot of roster holes, and $28,984,549 to fill the holes.  When you consider a max free agent will see a salary in the $20’s, that is not as much money as it appears.  The Nets simply cannot afford to further complicate their future books with a seventh man type of signing.  Deron is also the only player the Nets would want to wipe off those books, but that is a tall order: would you trade for Deron and not force the Nets to assume at least some future salary?

With that, the options available to the Nets this summer in free agency will be slim.  For starters, if Brook and Thad are back, that makes for 14 players under contract — and of the four nonguaranteed players, one seems sure to be back (Markel), while another seems to have a great chance (Cory Jefferson).  The Nets are also looking at two undrafted free agents in Cliff Alexander (per Tim Bontemps of the NY Post) and Ryan Boatright (per Shams Charania of RealGM).

Finally, in attempting to deal Deron and Joe, given their large salaries, any deal may result in taking back more than one piece in exchange to match money. So, even in exploring free agency, the Nets will not only have little money to spend (a minimum contract, or a cap exception) but also few roster spots to fill: really no more than 4 at the high end.

With that, the idea the Nets “need” to find a good reserve center for Lopez is not true.  If the Nets do not, worst case, they play Thad at the 5 when Brook sits, and use bench bigs like Jefferson and others to mop the time up: so long as Brook is not overextended, who plays when he sits is not important in a season in which sincere contention is not coming no matter what.  Come 2016 (when the goal is to start building a contender), the Brook reserve concern becomes very real, but it is not an issue this summer.

SO WHO CAN THE NETS SIGN?

Given the Nets’ lack of options, free agency will not be about headlines, but will be about scraping the bargain bin for finds.  Are there players who the league underrates?  Players who have more to give, but have not had the chance to show it for a variety of circumstances?  Fringe youth the Nets can take a look at, and see if it will stick beyond next season (as they seem to be doing with multiple young players).  Those are the types of questions the Nets will look to answer in free agency.

None of the names below are going to make the back page.  None are going to be on billboards, or in splashy pressers.  But no frills were made when the Hawks signed DeMarre Carroll.  Or the Spurs Danny Green.  Indeed, the best organizations tend to be great at finding low cost, “no name” pieces in the bargain bin, and uncovering legitimate rotation players, rather than overpaying those players once established.  The most likely result of the Nets summer spending: that they sign players in the scrap bin, and those players stay in the scrap bin.  Still, the Nets have nothing to lose in trying.

So, who may be available that is perhaps better than meets the eye?  The Nets are not going to fill a true need with the little free agency money they have (forget replacing Deron Jack or Blake at point), but can try to address their needs for size and shooting with low cost additions.

-Aron Baynes: With Mason Plumlee gone, the Nets can use a reserve center.  Baynes was a solid rim protector last season, with players shooting 48.4% with him in the vicinity at the rim, per nba.com stats.  And, with the Spurs trying to pry open flexibility to make a sincere run at LaMarcus Aldridge (or Marc Gasol or the like), a player like Baynes is likely an afterthought in their plans (as typically occurs with reserves when the focus shifts to larger targets). Baynes could provide toughness behind Lopez, and should come economically.

-Richard Jefferson: Jefferson of course brings feelings of nostalgia to the Nets’ fanbase, but bringing him back would have nothing to do with his name.  According to NBA.com’s tracking stats, Jefferson shot 43.2% on catch and shoot 3’s this season, on two attempts per game.  He does not have much to offer at this stage, but every team needs to hit the 3, and RJ is a competent rotation player who shoots the ball well in his now old age (an attribute the Nets’ roster can use). The concern: the Nets should not deprive Hollis-Jefferson or Bojan minutes to give them to a player like Jefferson.  With Dallas in an underdiscussed state of flux (Rondo and Ellis are gone, and Chandler’s return is to be determined) Jefferson is a player a team may easily grab amidst the smoke.  If used correctly and not taking too many minutes from Brooklyn’s youth, he can be a nice veteran leader off the bench who hits the 3.

–Wayne Ellington: Ellington had a down season shooting the ball for the Lakers, but there is one thing he knows how to do: shoot the basketball.  Ellington shot above 42% from 3 from 2012-2014, and could help the Nets in that area as a catch and shoot player when Lopez (or Deron or Joe if they return) is doubled.  The Lakers are trying to score big this summer, and Ellington is likely an afterthought.

–John Jenkins: Jenkins has been a disappointment in Atlanta.  He is a streaky shooter, who was supposed to be a very good one.  He does not guard.  And he found himself out of Atlanta’s rotation.  Still, Jenkins has upside as a shooter, despite bouncing from the Hawks to the D-League.  Is he someone who can develop into a rotation player? Maybe. Maybe not.  But he is only 24 years old, and a chance on him would be consistent with the types of chances on youth Brooklyn is currently taking.  The Hawks are saving all the cash they can to retain Paul Millsap and DeMarre Carroll; Jenkins should be readily available.

–Will Barton: According to NBA.com stats, in about 683 minutes with Barton on court last season, the Nuggets had a defensive rating of 102.1 — that number plummeted to 109.2 in 825 minutes with Barton on the bench.  Barton may provide a boost to the Nets defensively on the wing next year.  And with the Nuggets in a rebuild, he likely will not be a priority this summer in Denver, as the team has larger issues to deal with.  Mike Malone may like him, but he could be obtainable.

–Jeff Withey: Withey has no offensive game to speak of, but plays hard and defends, and at 25, fits into the Nets’ goal of stocking fringe youth to see what sticks.  Per NBA.com stats, players shot 10.8% worse within 6 feet with Withey defending than around other defenders.  He is a big body on the interior who can defend, and at least provide six fouls. Perhaps he becomes a useful backup behind Lopez next season.  Whether the Pelicans want him back is unclear.

–Quincy Acy: Acy is a bruiser who plays with toughness and reckless abandon, and rebounds the basketball. The Nets are suddenly small up front, and he may provide some toughness and grit for a team (believe it or not) in the hunt for a playoff berth. Many of the Nets’ options now at the 4 position revolve around going small.  Acy is barely a rotation player, but is one, and provides a larger option.

-Ish Smith:  Clearly, Ish Smith is not a name that rolls off the tongue.  On 8 teams in 5 years, he is the definition of a journeyman.  However, according to NBA.com stats, Smith ranked third in the NBA this season during his 25 games as a Sixer in team points per game off of drives to the basket — something the Nets do not do enough of.  Smith may be worth giving a one year deal, even with Deron, Jack, and Blake on the roster.   Smith is not an NBA starter, but perhaps has value off the bench, and is a low risk, cheap addition on a one year deal.