Brooklyn's Beat

When rooting for any basketball team, there can be a tendency to live and die with players in the moment.  After all, if Joe Harris had a great game last night, he must be good! And if Brook Lopez was poor last night, he must not be.  In addition, there is a tendency to evaluate players on the roster in comparison to one another, as opposed to in comparison to the league as a whole.

Nevertheless, Sean Marks cannot operate this summer on such fan like perceptions. Like or hate the Nets roster, and blame Sean Marks for a 6-15 record or not, one thing is certain: the Nets cannot become a playoff contender with this group of 15 players.  Over the course of time, changes will need to be made.

Nevertheless, in the interests of preserving some continuity, building a base of players who want to be here and can convey that desire to free agents, and maintaining the roster’s few positives as more are brought in, while roster change is necessary, not everyone is a goner.

So, what do the Nets have on their current roster? Here is a look at all 15 players, sorted by impact in the present.  A look at other teams’ depth charts, for comparison, is here.

The final tally: the Nets have one third banana, one clear starter, one low end starter or high end reserve, two sixth or seventh men, three fringe rotation players, two rosterable pieces, one unknown, two non NBA caliber players, and two players who solely offer leadership.

Here is the breakdown:

Brook Lopez: What the Nets have in Lopez is somewhat of a conundrum.  On one hand, Brook deserves more credit than many fans provide him.  In his ninth year, Brook is playing his best ever basketball, is shooting the three for the first time (a great thing for the Nets, whether they keep or dump him), and is moving better than ever.  Given his multiple foot surgeries, that Brook has become such a fantastic offensive player is a product of hard work, work that should not go unnoticed.  Brook is a top five offensive center.  On the other hand, Brook is likely a bottom ten defensive center.  He gets beat too often to loose balls, scored over too often inside, and out of place too often on defense.  He struggles defending the pick and roll — the most important action to defend.  At $21-$22 million, Lopez is properly paid, but if he seeks $25-$27 million per in 2018 (the three increases his value, and the cap has spiked), is he worth that?  Lopez is a good player who would thrive playing with a star as a third banana, but is miscast as a star with the Nets. Brook is likely a top 6-10 center.  However, whether the Nets should keep him is no easy question (and worth its own column).

Jeremy Lin: Given Lin’s sincere impact on the Nets in a small sample — the team looked competent with him and has cratered without him — Lin has value.  The Nets were fourteenth in the league offensively and eighteenth defensively when Lin got hurt. They are 24th and 28th respectively since.  Lin is also likely a top 15-20 point guard in the NBA, if one reviews the above NBA depth charts.  We should be at a point where people car not about where Lin or his family is from, and just evaluate him as a basketball player.  And to get a clear starting point guard for $11-$12 million per season is nothing short of an excellent move by the Nets this summer. Given the need teams have for multiple guards if they want to compete, Lin’s great contract, and the Nets need to bring quality players in without draft picks, it is hard to argue that the Nets should trade Lin. Lin is a clear starter.

Trevor Booker: Booker is the Nets’ third best player right now, and second best with Lin out.  That should say it all, as far as 6-15 is concerned.  Booker has been a nice find by Sean Marks, and I personally like Booker a lot: that all must be said.  Booker works hard, makes plays off the dribble and finishes better than anyone expected, defends, rebounds, and plays every game like it is his last.  He deserves credit for all of those things.  However, he is simply not good enough to be a team’s top two or three player.  Simply take a look at the depth chart of power forwards above: so many are better than Booker.  There are arguments against dealing Booker: if you are trying to build a culture of workers, Booker epitomizes that culture.  However, as a mid career veteran who provides mostly energy, players like Booker are readily available, at all times of the year. If the Nets can get value for him in the way of speculative youth or draft picks (good luck getting a first), that has to be considered. Booker is a low end starter or high end reserve.

Sean Kilpatrick: Without a doubt, Kilpatrick is one of the league’s best stories.  He was in the D league ten months ago.  And he had had a few tries to latch on with other teams, tried that failed.  However, he came to the Nets, and he found himself.  Kilpatrick is the second leading scorer on a NBA team — a bad one, sure, but given he was just a D leaguer, that is some story.  Kilpatrick is not perfect, and his struggles do get glossed over because he is such a feel good story. He can become too trigger happy with his shot, force jumpers or drives, and make poor decisions at times.  However, he is a very skilled scorer, and has value off an NBA bench as a sixth or seventh man. There is little reason for the Nets to let him go and they should exercise his option this summer.

Bojan Bogdanovic: It is true that Bogdanovic’s scoring is up, and that he has the ability to fill the bucket.  However, after hearing all summer about “Olympic Bojan,” and how good he would become, it must be said that expectations became out of whack.  Bogdanovic is shooting just 33.3% from 3, which is a problem because perimeter shooting is his supposed calling card.  Couple that with his being slow footed, and his struggles defensively, and I question Bogdanovic’s fit in Brooklyn.  In Caris LeVert, Spencer Dinwiddie, and Trevor Booker, the Nets have begun to quietly show a trend in their acquisitions, in that they want versatile players who can play multiple positions and have various skills. Bogdanovic is not versatile.  Does Sean Marks really want to pay him 50 million over 4 years to remain in Brooklyn, and remain as one of the worst starting wings in the league?  If not, it is time to explore the trade market. Because year 3 is the jump year for young players, and this year 3 is not that good. Bogdanovic is a sixth or seventh man.

Justin Hamilton: Hamilton is a better backup center than the fanbase gave him credit for when he was signed this summer.  His defense is passable.  And to date, despite a massive shooting slump, he is shooting 34.2% from three, which is competent for a big man.  Hamilton is readily movable, but he is a competent reserve, and low end or fringe rotation player.

Joe Harris: Harris has been up and down as a Net, but more up than down of late, which could be a sign of positive development.  He is shooting 36.6% from 3 on the year, and if he can remain above 36%, that provides the Nets with a bench weapon.  He is also surprisingly adept at putting the ball on the floor which is critical for any shooter.  Harris is a low end or fringe rotation player, easily replaceable for the Nets (unless he continues trending upward).

Isaiah Whitehead: Whitehead is far from polished as a point guard. He averages 3.5 turnovers per 36 minutes, which will have to be cut down if he is to become a reliable point guard in the NBA.  However, the hope with rookies is not to see a polished, finished product: often, rookies who do not make mistakes have less room for growth. The goal is to see upside, and that is present with Whitehead.  He is a good defender for a rookie, has good court vision, and competes.  For now, he is a low end or fringe rotation player. But there is something there. And he fits the Nets apparent goal of having multiple athletes between 6’5 and 6’8 who display versatility.

Rondae Hollis-Jefferson: There is a lot to like about RHJ.  He has a great attitude, and a sincere thirst to improve.  However, there is an elephant in the room.  Injuries last year aside, RHJ is a bad player in the present.  He is shooting 32% while forcing up shots, which is just brutal.  And despite his potential to be a great defender, one day, he is not there yet.  The Nets defensive rating is actually worse when RHJ is on the court.  At the moment, the idea of what RHJ could be is intriguing, but the actual of what he is is simply poor.  RHJ is rosterable, but is not a rotation player on a good team at this moment.  The question becomes: do the Nets believe he ever gets there? If not, he should be a trade candidate now. If, 12 months from now, he shows no growth, his value will go in the tank, as teams will weigh his actual more than his potential by then.

Anthony Bennett: Bennett is a bust; that has to be said. He was picked first in the draft, was supposed to go top 10, and has not produced to that level in now year 4, period. However, Brooklyn may have found something here.  Bennett did leapfrog Scola in the rotation. He is averaging 16.9 and 10.9 per 36 minutes, and his rebounding has been very good. The Nets are also better when he plays than when he sits. Bennett, for now, is merely rosterable, but even that is better than what he was one year ago.

Caris LeVert: LeVert at this point is an unknown simply due to the fact that he has played one game, and nine total NBA minutes. However, Brooklyn clearly believes in him, and I was a big fan of his debut. He has a great cadence handling the ball, a nose for the ball (recall those halfcourt steals), nice court vision, and a great attitude. Obviously, LeVert will need to develop from here, and has a ways to go, but his debut was a good sign of what he can be.  The early returns are good.

Spencer Dinwiddie: As of now, Dinwiddie is not a NBA caliber player, given what we now of him at this point.  The Pistons and Bulls gave him a shot, and he flamed out.  However, Dinwiddie has thrived in the D league, and at 6’6 he fits the mold of what Sean Marks wants to build.  Sean Kilpatrick flamed out of more than one stop before latching on with the Nets, so perhaps Dinwiddie latches on here.  However, there is precedent that indicates that he may not.

Chris McCullough: Young players deserve time to develop, and snap judgments are just not fair.  But McCullough is now 1.25 seasons into his career, and has shown nothing on a NBA court. His 19.9 and 8.1 D league averages are good, but not eye popping, and that is a concern: a NBA player should destroy the D league, and most commonly, the D leaguers that thrive at the next level did just that. McCullough is not a NBA caliber player until he shows otherwise.

Randy Foye and Luis Scola: Both are high character veterans who provide end of the roster leadership.  Neither, frankly, provides anything more than that at this juncture.

It’s July 24th.  Sure, Sean Marks has said he does not know if the Nets are ever done.  And sure, trades, and smaller signings, occur in August and September, even in October.

Still, with 15 guaranteed deals signed, and the free agent market virtually barren of talent, the offseason is largely wrapped up.  Trades can happen at anytime, but teams are generally done constructing their rosters for next year, aside from opportunities that may, but won’t certainly, arise.

So with that, it is time to grade Sean Marks on his first offseason.  Before the grades, here are two general points to keep in mind:

First: There are many factors outside of a GM’s control.  For any team, so much of what happens, results wise, is outside of a GM’s control, for better or for worse.  A GM like say, Dennis Lindsey in Utah, is not regarded by many casual fans as a great GM, but has done a great job in Utah adding talent piece by piece, despite starting behind the 8 ball when pieces like Deron Williams and Paul Millsap decided to bolt.  On the flip side, a GM like Masai Ujiri is well regarded by fans — and does deserve that.  Still, he benefitted from inheriting a 50 game winner in Denver at a time when the Knicks chose to overpay for Melo (regardless of who the Nuggets GM was), and benefitted in Toronto from Kyle Lowry and DeMar DeRozan emerging beyond expectations (remember: Ujiri’s goal was to deal Lowry and rebuild. DeRozan, at around $9M per annum, was considered overpaid.  Masai is good, but has benefitted from good fortune).  With Marks, the same applies.  The Nets poor asset situation, and unattractiveness due free agents due to the record and asset lack, were and are factors outside Marks’ control.  He can still be evaluated, but those limitations — and the way they affected free agent desire in Brooklyn — HAVE to be factored into the evaluation.

Second: Not all moves, for any GM, can be fully evaluated in the year in which they are made.  The goal for all teams in their building is to construct a contender.  Not only are most teams incapable of winning a title in a given year when it starts, but most teams are incapable of constructing a title contender in a given summer.  When those teams make moves, the idea is not just to judge them in a vacuum, based on how it affects that year’s team, but to judge them while keeping in mind the future, and how it affects the future. A move to open cap space may not just be about that summer, but also about future summers.  An asset today may help build tomorrow.  All of those things must be considered: for the Nets, 21-61 last year with no top 54 pick heading into the offseason, there is no way to believe that the goal this summer was to construct the 2017 NBA champs. The goal was to position the Nets for creating a contender, in the 2018-2022 time frame.

With that, on to how Marks did.

I. The Good Things

A) Signing Jeremy Lin, Greivis Vasquez, Luis Scola, and Randy Foye, drafting Isaiah Whitehead, and the creative contract given Whitehead: The Nets needed a good point guard this summer.  They got one in Lin.  Lin was a productive Charlotte Hornet last year.  He was part of multiple good, winning lineups, thrived when he started, and finished many big games.  He is a gigantic upgrade over last year’s group.  Some will allege that marketing, or ethnicity, matters here. Frankly, I do not care about those things, and have always evaluated Lin as a basketball player: just as I would evaluate Amir Johnson, Thaddeus Young, or George Hill.  And on that evaluation, I like Lin for this team.  As for Whitehead, this is very simple: the Nets had the 55th pick in the draft, and Whitehead was never falling that low.  They got him by moving up 13 spots, and all it took to do it was a billionaire’s cash.  Whitehead’s contract: icing on the cake.  With no second round rookie scale, the second round provides for some creativity, contract wise.  The Nets, by offering Whitehead nearly $1 million per when the minimum was $543,000, were able to leverage the slight raise into 4 years of control.  Many teams only control their second rounders for one or two years, because they simply provide a small contract, and the player, knowing that, does not want to be tied up long term.  The Nets leveraged a larger initial guarantee into four years of control — two of which are team options.  Now, if Whitehead is good, he is theirs for awhile.  If he is not, he is gone after two years – and the $800-$900K lost over two years will have had little effect on building the rest of the roster.  As for Vasquez, Scola, and Foye, any rebuild needs veterans to show the young players the way: you cannot have fifteen young guys.  Scola, Vasquez, and Foye do that, but, unlike players like Nazr Mohammed and Elton Brand who also do that, do that while having some basketball left in their tanks.  There were, arguably, better players than Vasquez Scola and Foye at their price points.  But no matter what, the Nets were not getting core pieces for the future in their respective places.  The goal was about pieces who fit the rebuild: given their character and reputations these three do, very much so.

B) Stocking their D-League roster through summer league: So far, the adds are Yogi Ferrell, Egidujis Mockevicius, and Beau Beech.  It must be said: these are undrafted free agents who have never played in the NBA.  It cannot be said, with any certainty, that any of these players will do anything in the NBA.  To say and of these players are good NBA players, right now, is just too extreme.  Still, the Nets do need to add as much youth to their organization as possible in the hope that some of the youth pops more than most expected to date.  Can they add the next Gerald Green, Langston Galloway, or other D-League player that carved out a NBA role?  That is the goal.  The Nets recognize that this is important and that is a good thing.

C) Going after Allen Crabbe and Tyler Johnson: Yes.  The Nets offer sheets were matched. Still, going after Crabbe and Johnson was the right play.  The Nets need to add legitimate young talent to this roster that can grow.  They tried, with these offers.  The offers were the correct plays, for multiple reasons:

i) What better player was available: The Nets simply could not reject giving out offer sheets under the guise “we can sign someone better.” Player rankings are always arbitrary, but this is a nice sampling of the top 117 free agents by Tom Ziller.  Let’s break it down. Frankly, I am not going to consider players who did not make the list: if your gripes with the Nets arise from the lack of consideration of players ranked outside of a subjective list of the 117 best free agents, you are just plain unreasonable.

-First, Whether it was because the Nets never had a shot due to their record, they declined a meeting with the Nets, they met with the Nets and elected to go elsewhere (Bazemore, Marvin Williams), or they signed with their incumbent and no other suitors had a shot, the Nets simply did not have a shot with the following free agents, such that to suggest they show the offer sheets were the wrong play is just wrong: Durant, LeBron, Drummond, Conley, Horford, DeRozan, Whiteside, Dirk, Wade (it was always Chicago or Miami if you’re being realistic), Parsons (he wanted to win immediately), Batum, Beal, Gasol, Marvin Williams, Clarkson, Fournier, Meyers Leonard, Livingston, Amir Johnson, Tyler Zeller, Jared Dudley, Zaza Pachulia, Joe Johnson (he wants to win), Courtney Lee (the Knicks ready made talent factored into his decision), David West, and Darrell Arthur.

Here’s the thing: that is a lot of talent the Nets simply did not have a chance at getting. Sure, any offer to a RFA is a risk, but when you consider that those 27 free agents simply were not available, that “risk” is not all that high — who exactly is being missed out on.

-Second, nobody else on the market warranted not trying to get Crabbe and Johnson.  Dwight or Bismack Biyombo? The Nets have Lopez at center, and even if the idea is to  deal Lopez to spend at other positions, their deals are large as well. Joakim Noah, Eric Gordon, Miles Plumlee, Ryan Anderson, Evan Turner, Luol Deng, Timofey Mozgov, Arron Afflalo, Matthew Dellavedova, Ian Mahinmi, Jamal Crawford, Harrison Barnes, Jeff Green (he’s miserable at basketball and nobody seems to catch on), or Solomon Hill?  All were overpaid — and all represent bullets dodged by Brooklyn. Dion Waiters, JR Smith, Lance Stephenson, Rajon Rondo, Brandon Jennings, or Ty Lawson?  First, other than Rondo, all are still on the board – the offer sheets had no effect.  Second, the Nets are trying to build a world class culture from a state of abject rubble — that takes time, and that cannot be done on the backs of players like this, who have assorted character and shot selection related issues.  Arguably, these players can be plugged into a first class culture and reigned in by it, but they cannot help a nascent culture grow, they only can derail it.   Rondo’s last 3 teams could not wait to see him go, Lance one ups that at 4.  Lawson failed in second and third chances last year, and did so miserably.  Waiters?  The Cavs could not wait to dump him, and the Thunder have shown 0 desire to keep him. Jennings?  The Bucks benefitted by dumping him, he was awful for the Pistons and they relished dumping him, and he was awful for Orlando last year – the Knicks are taking a flier and nothing more than that.  Smith did thrive in Cleveland, which is an example of a world class culture reigning a character in, but he failed in other stops — the Nets obviously do not have a LeBron like presence to keep him in line.  How does his lifestyle and shot selection impact a developing group?

-Third, the offer helps boost the Nets reputation with players and agents.  For this, think about the Clippers’ courtship of LeBron in 2010.  The Clippers were a laughingstock at the time.  Obviously LeBron did not sign there.  But word let out that LeBron was impressed by their organization.  That word was huge in helping the Clippers nab Chris Paul within two years, and then keep him long term.  Now, the Clippers are a perennial contender.  The Nets hope to have similar success here.  Crabbe talks, as does Johnson, as does their representation.  And the hope is the talk will be about how impressed they were with the Nets despite things not working out.  That can pay dividends with future free agents, especially if the things the Nets laid out in those meetings begin coming true as represented.

D) Not Panicking after losing out on Crabbe and Johnson by spending on the wrong pieces: To say the Nets “did not spend” this summer, is technically true given the numerous one year deals, or two year deals where year 2 is a team option, but belies the truth.  The Nets committed $125 million to Crabbe and Johnson, with four year pacts apiece.  Their belief in both players going forward was obvious.  When the offers were rebuffed, the Nets earned points this summer by doing something smart: they did not panic, overreact, and pay players they don’t believe in in the same way, just to save face.

Want an example of a panic deal?  The Celtics and Wizards vied for Al Horford with the Hawks.  When the Celtics nabbed him, the Wizards, almost moments later, gave Ian Mahinmi 4 years, $64 million.  Mahinmi is a career reserve center or pinch starter; this was a laughable overpay, an overpay that did not get the attention the Mozgov overpay got, due to it not occurring on day one of free agency, not occurring in LA, and being buried in the news cycle when the Horford news was dominating Twitter.  That does not change the cap hit of the deal.  The Wizards so obviously panicked that they struck out on Horford, and “saved face” by getting someone, in Mahinmi.  The Nets, smartly, did not take that course.  They did not pay Miles Plumlee $53 million over 4 years.  They did not give restricted free agent Donatas Motiejunas — who is coming off a severe back injury — a big, long term contract his body indicates would be soon regretted.  They did not panic pay Dion Waiters simply because he is a name out there people can put a face to — the Nets would have tired of his shot selection and looked to get out from under his bad contract well before it became movable.  They did not panic pay Moe Harkless, who, in light of the Crabbe match, would not be obtainable absent a Tyler Johnson or larger offer — an offer not advisable given Harkless’ production, and inability to shoot.  The Nets seem to be prioritizing shooting and spacing from the wings, and Harkless provides neither.

What did the Nets do? Multiple things.  First, they did add Jeremy Lin to the roster.  Given the critical nature of point guard play, and the more natural synergy a pick and roll guard like Lin would have with Lopez than a guy like Thad Young, the Nets did add to the roster.  Second, the Nets added a mix of speculative youth — pieces they hope can develop, and high character veterans who can teach that youth the ropes.  Most importantly? The Nets have dramatically increased their flexibility.  Assuming Lin opts out in 2018, every single Nets contract expires by 2018 (unless the Nets pick up team options).  Not a piece on the roster is hard to move: the Nets can pivot at the deadline in any direction.  If the roster looks fairly decent, they can package kids for a veteran.  If the roster looks very bad, they can deal Lopez for kids and pivot in that direction.  With $18.8 million in cap room this year, the Nets can take on contracts at the deadline without sending out matching salaries, and charge the cap space the sending team is eating in the form of draft picks.  Randy Foye was dealt for second rounders last deadline.  Luis Scola and Greivis Vasquez are high character veterans with a little in the tank, veterans a contender may be willing to add in exchange for similar assets.

Only six Nets — Lopez, Lin, Booker, Hamilton, LeVert, and Whitehead, make guaranteed money next year, and all six are movable.  The Nets have team options on five young players, in RHJ, McCuollough, Bennett, Harris, and Kilpatrick.  They can keep all five, and enter the summer with $41 million in space while eleven players are under contract.  They can decline any options on players who struggle.  They can also easily move any of the five at the deadline.  Only four players are free agents (Bojan Scola Vasquez and Foye) and only one is arguably a future core piece in Bojan. Bojan, for that matter, is also easily movable if it is determined he is not a core piece.

The Nets are not good. Not right now. But they have optionality going forward, and that is what is most important in a rebuild. The Nets responded to losing out on a successful offseason — adding Crabbe and Johnson would have been just that — by deciding that having a neutral offseason beat having a bad one.  That was smart.

II. The Bad

Yes, the Nets offseason had productive aspects. Still, the Nets did make moves that, while not necessarily wanting staunch criticism (the Nets did not hurt themselves going forward), some of their moves do warrant noting as moves that may have hurt, and at least bear watching going forward.

a) The Trevor Booker contract: Booker’s contract is not a total disaster, by any means.  Booker is a useful reserve big who can defend several positions, and who has made an effort to expand offensively.  He will make a little over $9M annually, and the deal is short on years at just 2, which is a good thing.  When one sees deals given to reserves like Dwight Powell (4/$37), Jon Leuer (4/$42), Austin Rivers (3/$35), E’Twaun Moore (4/$34), Jerryd Bayless (3/$27), DJ Augustin (4/$29), and Andrew Nicholson (4/$26), the contract Booker got is defensible, from a market perspective.  However, it should be noted that other veterans that came off the board as free agency waned on may have been more helpful pieces, with smaller (or similar commitments).  Festus Ezeli was a steal on a 2/$16 deal.  Jared Sullinger was essentially banished from Boston and only signed for a 1/$6 deal. Mirza got a little much at 3/$30, but he can shoot, and that seems to be an objective with building the new program. Terrence Jones was flat out bad last year but only got around 1/$1.5, and may make good on that deal. Nene is an older veteran who is totally different than Booker (he is bigger, slower, and older), but he got just 1/$3.  Roy Hibbert has lost his way but got a friendly 1/$4 deal. Jordan Hill is not as good as his name (for whatever reason) reflects, but 1/$4 is a solid figure for him.  Pieces like Al Jefferson and Boban Marjanovic are not neat fits behind Lopez but their deals were reasonable as well.

Booker may be a solid Net. He provides an energy and athleticism element other Nets do not provide.  In light of the goal to add more talented versatile wings, the Nets may decide not to spend big at the 4 going forward. And pieces like a Nene or Al Jefferson, unlike a relatively young Booker, are less likely to grow with the roster.

Still, Booker’s deal, while not a definite overpay, was close.  That is a blemish for Marks, at least for now, and warrants watching.

b) The Justin Hamilton contract: It has to be said.  We do not know if Hamilton can produce at the NBA level, and the Nets gave him a deal that cuts into their 2017 flexibility.  That could be a mistake, if he is not a NBA player.  Still, the deal is defensible.  Hamilton can shoot the ball, and the Nets, in trying to build a team that can compete at a high level, want to prioritize skills you see on good teams — like bigs who can spread the floor.  He had a very good year in Spain last year, so of course the hope is that translates.  Hamilton also was considered a sleeper free agent by Kevin Pelton of ESPN.  His skill set is an intriguing one if it translates, and if it does, this may not be a blemish for Marks.  Still, like Booker, this contract belongs in this column, until further notice.

III. The debatable, and yet to be determined: the Thaddeus Young trade

The Young trade, like it or hate it, was a significant endeavor.  On one hand, you can certainly argue this was a bad deal for Brooklyn.  Flatly, there is a significant chance that Caris LeVert, the second rounder the Next will receive from the Pacers between 2017-2013, and the future talent signed as a byproduct of dealing Young (primarily at the 4) will all never become better than Young.  At a minimum, even if you argue for the trade (frankly, I get the rationale behind the trade, but am lukewarm about it overall), you have to acknowledge those risks in assesing the deal.

On the other hand, however, there are multiple bases justifying the trade.  First, going forward, you can only pay so many non superstars, before you are stuck in neutral.  The Nets are paying Lopez.  They chose to pay Lin.  They may pay pieces like Bogdanovic, Hollis Jefferson, and others, in the future.  Young is good, but is another non superstar to pay.

Second, the take has often been spun as LeVert (who, for the record, cannot himself be judged on mock drafts and should be judged after he actually plays games), and 2016 cap space.  But the take is more than that.  The Nets added cap room with this deal not just in 2016, but also in 2017 and 2018 (Young could opt into his deal then).  The Nets had more spending power this summer to add players like Crabbe and Johnson who they believe can grow over time with their program, instead of “is what he is” Young (although, yes, it did not work).  They  have that same ability in 2017, and in 2018.

Third, the trade represents a proactive strike in team building. The Nets, with every piece, need to decide.  Is this piece a core piece to grow with, or not?  If not, you need to get assets before losing a piece in free agency.  Thad was going to be free in 2018 assuming an opt out.  You then face the following: do I pay $15-$20 million to a non star, or lose him for nothing. The Nets avoided that by getting value for Young now. Not only that, but consider: if Thad is out the door in 2018, and the Nets are not contending in 2016-2017, that means that Thad provides no value, unless the Nets contend in 2017-2018. What is the chance of that?  The Nets decided that Young’s impact in the short term for a likely noncontender did not warrant keeping him when he a) is not getting better, and b) will cost a ton to keep. They instead got multiple assets for him: a rookie, a future rookie, and additional financial flexibility. To look at this as “they traded him to sign Booker and Hamilton” is way too simplistic, and just is not true.

Fourth, it should be noted that Young has been moved in the past for an ancient Kevin Garnett, and a lottery protected first rounder and filler. In getting a pick near the lottery, and a second rounder, it cannot be said that the Nets got a lot less for Thad than prior teams who dealt him.

So, in sum: the Young trade could be a loser for the Nets — Thad is a good player!  It also could be a winner, depending on how the roster looks 48 months from now, how good LeVert is, and how the second round pick coming down the line fares.

THE GRADE: I give Marks a solid B.  On one hand, Marks had a very good plan this summer, to add young assets the team can grow with, in Crabbe and Johnson.  When plan A did not work, he did a good job shifting to a low risk plan B which provides some intriguing pieces, all of whom are easily movable, and providing the team with flexibility to pivot in assorted directions at the deadline.  Critically, Marks did this while losing out on some mid and lower tier free agents — but nobody significant that both could have moved the program and would have considered the Nets as an option.  For all of that, Marks cannot get a below average grade, and his grade should fall in the A or B range.  As for going with a B?  Results do matter, and by not obtaining Crabbe or Johnson, despite lacking control, Marks did not substantially move the program forward — he moved it forward by starting to build a culture and grabbing Lin, but not significantly so.  For that lack of significant movement, I cannot award an A range grade, especially when the questionable deals to Booker and Hamilton, and risk of the Thad trade, are taken into account.

Marks so far has the makings of a good GM.  He gives out creative contracts. He is forward thinking about flexibility and assets.  He makes the moves he believes are best, not the move the fans want.  All of this helps the Nets going forward.

May 2016. High above ground, 30,000 feet thereabouts. 
I sat on a plane, flying for a vacation with my wife. My wife fell asleep. I had nobody to talk to.
So what did I do? I started ranking NBA players. Not because there is any real value to it. But I love basketball. And you have to kill time doing something, right?
Here is a representative sampling of one portion of my rankings (these are far from scientific)

-George Hill, Thaddeus Young, Michael Kidd-Gilchrist, Marcus Smart, Marvin Williams, Jeremy Lin, Kelly Olynyk, Elfrid Payton, Cory Joseph, Amir Johnson, Patrick Patterson
See where I am going with this?
Jeremy Lin is a good, solid player to have on a basketball team. He can be a low end starter on a good team, or a high end reserve. And there is no doubt about it. 
Want proof Lin can be a critical piece for a winner. Don’t be lazy and simply look at last year. The Hornets were 48-34, and ranked 9th in both offense and defense: they were very good. Sure, they did not win their first round playoff series, but saying “they got bounced in the first round” is reductive. That was clearly a good team. And Lin was a major part of that. He played 26 minutes per game and despite not starting regularly, thrived when he did. He also played critical minutes in big games. Batum Lin Walker Zeller Williams lineups had a +8.8 Net Rating, when the team overall was only a +3.3. 
Yes, Lin is no star. Far from it. But if the Nets brought in Amir Johnson of Patrick Patterson, nobody would be yelling that they made a transparent marketing move. Or that the player was awful, and that it showed the Nets are awful. Likely, they would say that the Nets did not get a great player, or a franchise shaper, but that they made a nice pickup.
Really, there is no reason to say anything different about Jeremy Lin. The Nets made a solid addition to their team by adding him, and seriously upgraded over the sad sack point guard group of a year ago.
So why does anyone judge it so differently. Why do people get so up in arms about Lin, in a way they do not about comparable players?
Without speaking with people about it individually, nobody can definitively say. However, it is likely the animus toward Lin comes from different places. Maybe it’s the attention he got as a Knick in 2012, and a persistent agenda to put him down because of that. Maybe it is because he made his way as a Knick, and Nets fans dislike the Knicks. And, yes: maybe for some, it is more nefarious, and relates to his ethnicity, or a belief that he is only well liked because of his ethnicity.
My take: forget all that. I never care where a player is from, what his ethnicity is, or where he played before. Nobody should. All that matters: how good is the player? What does the player project to be in the future? All players, be they African American, Caucasian, Asian American, or of the world’s 200+ countries, should be evaluated that precise way, without regard to their heritage, the way the media covers them, or anything else.
We do it with Patrick Patterson. We do it with George Hill. So we should do it with Jeremy Lin (note: I am not saying people should not admire and like Jeremy Lin and look to him as an example, whether or not they share his ethnicity. I am solely talking about played evaluation).
The counter to this of course for some is the elephant in the room: Lin undoubtedly is more marketable, and a boon for Brett Yormark and his staff, than are those players of similar playing ability. To deny that, yes, is to deny a fact. 
But correlation is not causation. When the Nets inked Crabbe and Johnson to offer sheets, that made for four potential Nets (Lin and Lopez too) wth California roots. Nobody said “the Nets are obsessed with targeting California guys, for the common sense reason that correlation does not imply causation.
The same applies here. Lin is a solid basketball player. The Nets need solid basketball players. Lin is a solid point guard. The Nets desperately needed sold point guards. Signing Lin is a basketball transaction being made by Sean Marks for basketball reasons. Just because the signing is marketable does not mean its marketability CAUSED the signing. Lin is clearly no Kevin Durant, not close. If the Nets signed Durant, it would make them more marketable, but nobody would call marketing the CAUSE of the signing, just a coincidental byproduct. With Lin, that is also what we have. He is no Durant but the signing makes basketball sense irrespective of any marketing. 
And when you consider Lin is making less money than Mozgov, Noah, Marvin Williams, Eric Gordon, Evan Turner, Rajon Rondo, Arron Afflalo, Ian Mahinmi, Jamal Crawford, and Jeff Green, barely more money than players like Jon Leuer, DJ Augustin, and Austin Rivers, his contract is an incredible value — be his name Jeremy Lin or Jeremy Jones.
Lastly, should Brett Yormark have commented on the marketing impact Lin has. No. Not when, given the Nets explicitly saying they did the Boston deal for brand based purposes, the Nets have a stigma for making a splash instead of the sound move of substance.
That does not mean that this is not the sound move of substance. 
Jeremy Lin is a good basketball player who helps the Nets at a critical position, and position of huge need, who is on a value contract. Judge him through that prism. Your other prisms are lazy, or worse. 

Want an impossible job? Swap places with Sean Marks. 

Everyone knows the specifics, so there is no need to go into terrible detail. The Nets went 21-61 last year yet owed their next 3 first draft picks (one via swap) to Boston, with even more second rounders out the window. They did this with two starters in their thirties and no core piece under 25 other than a non lottery pick who missed most of the year injured. 

The last time a team was in such bad condition asset wise was the early 1980s; when the Cavaliers were owned by Ted Stepien. The NBA literally changed its rules and provided help to the Cavs to help them dig out.

Yes, that is how bad of shape the team was that Marks inherited. With no draft picks, tank and pick high was no option. Nor, frankly, was manipulate the market to sign bigtime free agents — those players want to win, and did not even grant meetings to the Nets. 

Marks knew heading into this offseason that he needed to build the Nets into a 30-40 win team, instead of a 20-30 win team, to pique free agent interest in the future. He also knew, however, that doing that is not enough — he also needed to do that while retaining the financial and asset flexibility to take that next step to the 45-55 win level, as opposed to hitting a plateau. 

To achieve that, everything Marks has done made sense. 

The offer sheets to Crabbe and Johnson

It is easy to criticize the offer sheets without analysis: Marks did not get the players. However, that shallow analysis ignores the logic behind the offer sheets that justified their being given out.

Yes, players like Chris McCullough, Isaiah Whitehead, and others may have NBA futures. How we, their ability to become critical components of a good NBA team is unclear. There is nothing wrong with the Nets adding pieces like that, speculative additions in the hope some young players pop, even though others kick the bucket.

But you simply cannot build a team around fringe youth. You need either lottery picks, or young players who have a proven ability to produce. Marks cannot obtain the former, not unless he deals Brook Lopez, and to do that would be to descend to 10 win territory, yet still have a dramatic pick deficit.

So Marks shot for the latter. He made every effort to recruit quality youth into his program — youth that has proven its ability and has plenty of potential to grow with the organization. He committed a combined $31.25 million per year over 4 years to attempt to coax a balk from the Heat and Blazers. It would be hard to expect bigger offers than that. 

The offers, while rebuffed, reflect Marks’ plan. He wants to address the lack of young talent by adding young talent on the market that can grow and improve, internally, post acquisition. 

The Thaddeus Young trade once again.

The plan explains the unpopular Thad Young trade. As always with this deal it must be noted: Young is a good player, a nice fourth or fifth starter on a good team. He is better than any power forward the Nets have. His deal is cap friendly. And when viewing his deal together with the Jazz dealing the 12 pick for George Hill (who is a bit better than Thad), and The Hornets dealing the 22 pick for Marco Belinelli (who is clearly worse than Thad), you can argue the Nets should have gotten a pick closer to 15 than 20. 

Still, picking five mid first picks later is not a terrible value loss. More importantly, assume the Nets two offer sheets were not matched and they kept Thad. Sub out Booker and LeVert (obviously), and one or Scola or Vasquez (due to cap constraints), and the roster would be capped out.

Then, in 2017?  The Nets would have around 10 million in cap room to spend on free agents; around $7.4 million if RHJ and McCullough were retained. That would not factor in Bogdanovic, a free agent – nor his cap hold. $7.4 million gets you an E’Twaun Moore, a DJ Augustin.

In short: if the Nets kept Thad and hit on their offer sheets, that’s it. What you saw next year would be what you get with the Nets, going forward. 

Marks did not want to be in that position and that is why Thad is not a Net. Thad would have helped the Nets win games, in the immediate term. In the long term, however, you can only pay so many non superstars, and the Nets prioritized players who, unlike Thad, have room to grow and improve — Thad is good but also is what he is. The Nets value Brook higher than Thad. They value Lin higher than Thad – a debatable choice but a reasonable one given the importance of quality guard play. 

And they also value the youth they hope to add to the roster to grow with the roster — the youth they know they need — over Thad.

More Crabbe and Johnson: why not say yes to other restricted free agents

An obvious Plan B to Crabbe and Johnson: giving free agents like Moe Harkless, Dion Waiters, or the like. That however does not make sense. 

The idea in signing Crabbe and Johnson was that the multiyear, and big dollar, commitments, reflected a belief that they could be part of the future core. There is no value to the Nets in paying pieces who they do not perceive as future core pieces, merely because “that is what is out there.” Such contracts become the precise bad contracts teams look to get out from under. 

Giving Harkless $50 million because prior offers failed may “save face” in the short run. But when it hamstrings you next summer and, as he is a 4 and your goal is to get high level talent at the 1-3 spots, does not significantly move the needle, does that save of face matter, at all? 

Giving out big money to talent that helps is absolutely something Marks wants to do; hence the offer sheets. It would be foolish to spend for the sake of it because you only regret that later. 

This is why you are seeing the one year deals the Nets have given out this week; if a player is not a program mover, he cannot get big years on a deal. If that means losing out on a player, then best of luck elsewhere.

Indeed, the Nets one year deals do not show an unwillingness to get and pay players – but an unwillingness to pay players who are not perceived as program movers.

One last Crabbe and Johnson note: who better was available to the Nets

For one last time, the Crabbe and Johnson offers were fine gambles. In addition, the “loss of targets by putting all eggs in one basket” that some are worried about, is dramatically overstated. 

Here is a nice free agent list by Tom Ziller of sbnation, for those who wish to peruse: http://www.sbnation.com/2016/6/28/12029662/nba-free-agents-list-ranking-rumors-2016-kevin-durant

Even a simple look at that list shows that the Nets did not forego any significant targets (only program movers are significant targets) by going after Crabbe and Johnson.

The Nets did not have a shot with the following players: LeBron (obvious); Durant (obvious); Drummond (Detroit would not let him leave as an RFA); Conley, Parsons and Gasol (they only met with winning teams); Bazemore (he met the Nets and they were a finalist); Horford (he declined Nets meetings); DeRozan (he was committed to Toronto); Marvin Williams (he met the Nets and chose to remain a Hornet); Wade (it was down to Heat-Bulls); Dirk and Manu (they’re lifers); Batum (he never truly hit the open market); Fournier, Clarkson, and Beal (they never hit the market);

The following critical signings play Brook’s position: Whiteside; Biyombo; Ezeli

The following players are bad fits when trying to build a culture from the ground up around impressionable young players: Dwight, Rondo, Stephenson

The following players are not program movers: 

Do you want Harrison Barnes at $94 million over 4? Joakim Noah AT 72 over 4. Eric Gordon at 53 over 4. Ryan Anderson at 80 over 4  and Evan Turner at 75 over 4. 

Translation: it is so easy to say tha the Nets by committing to the two RFA’s missed out on other targets. But simple, quick scrutiny shows that this is not the case 

You can love or hate Sean Marks. You can be indifferent.

Regardless, Sunday was a tough day for Marks and the Nets.  Despite investing heavily in Allen Crabbe and Tyler Johnson, the Blazers and Heat respectively matched both contracts.

The result: the Nets now have $35 million in cap room, pending what they paid new signee Greivis Vasquez, and little to spend it on.

Still, the Nets plan to try to add Crabbe and Johnson was a worthy, justifiable endeavor.  Here is why.

I. Who else was available?

Expect the Nets to get someone better than Crabbe or Johnson?  Check what has happened in free agency thus far.

Kevin Durant and LeBron James: hah.  Kent Bazemore met the Nets and others, but decided not to become a Net or leave Atlanta.  Al Horford didn’t get that far with Brooklyn. Evan Fournier never hit the market. Bismack Biyombo plays your best player’s position, as do Cole Aldrich and Al Jefferson. A team trying to be younger and build a hard working culture should not add Dwight Howard and Rajon Rondo.

Timofey Mozgov, Ian Mahinmi, Solomon Hill, Jeff Green, Jon Leuer, Harrison Barnes, Ryan Anderson, and Evan Turner were overpays.  Luol Deng arguably was too, and does not fit the timeline of a younger group; nor does Mirza Teletovic.  Matthew Dellavedova is a nice player, but he’s not Crabbe or Johnson, and received a big deal. Tim Frazier stayed with the Pelicans team that found him.  Andrew Bogut wanted to play with a perceived winner, as did Chandler Parsons and perhaps Boris Diaw (the Spurs perhaps accommodated him with the deal).

Veterans like Pau Gasol, Richard Jefferson, Zaza Pachulia, David West, and perhaps Joe Johnson, Joakim Noah, and Courtney Lee, were hellbent on playing with a winner.  Dwyane Wade was only going to Chicago.

Other veterans, like Nene, signed cap friendly deals, but the Nets are not in win now mode, and you can find a vet later in free agency — like the Nets just did with Vasquez.  Brandon Jennings is not helping your youth develop, and has done nothing other than have a catchy name people can identify. Why sign veterans like Gerald Henderson, Jerryd Bayless, Arron Afflalo, Brandon Rush, and Jason Smith who barely move your program to multiyear deals?  The goal with a vet is to help show professionalism to your kids…which a vet who isn’t affecting future flexibility can do.

Perhaps the Nets missed out on pieces like Andrew Nicholson, Langston Galloway, and James Ennis.  None, however, is a starter, and other than arguably Galloway, who is more of a seventh man, none are close.  To forego opportunities to sign pieces of this caliber because you identified a starting caliber shooting guard in Crabbe who you would like to bring in as a 23 year old to grow with your organization, and a potential sixth man or low end starter in Johnson to do the same, is a fine risk.

A risk that may have worked out, for the record.  The Nets’ offer for Crabbe was overwhelming.  Portland nearly balked.  As for Johnson, he only is not a Net because Pat Riley decided to stop building around Wade — nobody saw that coming.

II. The Offers reveal a defined plan

The nets are not spending their money willy nilly.  Unlike Thaddeus Young — a good player — Crabbe and Johnson are younger pieces who, over a long term period, can develop and grow.  The Nets NEED sources of internal development and tried to find two sources here.  The Nets have simply decided that with only so much money to go around, they want to pay pieces like that, not pieces who cannot help the organization get better by improving over time. That is a worthy endeavor.

III. The Vasquez signing is exciting not because of Vasquez …

But because it reinforces a disciplined commitment to the Nets’ plan.  The worst thing a team can do, after losing out on a target, is make a panic “save face” signing, to say that they got SOMEONE.  The quintessential panic move: the Wizards finished second or third in the Al Horford sweepstakes.  Moments after losing out, they gave $64 million to Ian Mahinmi; Mahinmi is not worth that figure and his fit with Marcin Gortat is unclear.  Simply, the Wizards panicked and said “after that, we need to get someone.”

Vasquez, a 29 year old on a one year deal, clearly is not a panic signing.  A slightly smaller offer sheet to a poor choice to add to the organization? That would have been.

Vasquez will give the Nets some production, and a veteran to help mentor their kids . . . without saddling their books long term.

IV. So What’s Next

Even assuming a $10 million commitment to Vasquez over one year, the Nets would have 11-13 players in house (depending on if you count the partial guarantees), and $25 million in room.  The Nets would likely wish t add young talent to grow with, but options may be limited, and the Nets cannot spend recklessly and kill future flexibility.

Tyler Zeller is a sleeper of a free agent.  Dion Waiters, for all the criticism, was a useful part for a 55 win group last year.  He can be useful, but the Nets would need to be prudent with the salary, arguably even the years, there.  Moe Harkless is out there, but again, prudence would be wise.  Donatas Motiejunas is a piece to be careful with because of severe back issues, as is Terrence Jones; Jones flat out has been bad for over one year.  Jared Sullinger has talent, but money and years again are an issue.

Further down the line, PJ Hairston is a young wing with talent who cannot put it together or stick anywhere; he could be worth a look.  Luis Scola, Anderson Varejao, Tayshaun Prince, and Matt Bonner are all good veterans for your kids to learn from.  Christian Wood is a speculative young talent worth a look. Anthony Bennett is close to his last chance but not quite there yet.

Another subject for another day and article: the Nets timeline is set back a little by not getting Crabbe and Johnson. Trading Brook Lopez, or Bojan Bogdanovic to avoid paying him next summer, is no guarantee, but at least has to be discussed.