Category Archives: Analytics

Brook Lopez has now been a Net for 8.5 years.  Lopez becomes a free agent in the summer of 2018.  He is 28 years old. And his Nets are 9-38.

The constant losing in Brooklyn has caused fans to become restless, as losing does in all markets. When fans are losing, they want change.  Good or bad, they want change, because, in their minds, doing SOMETHING beats doing NOTHING,  because losing is horrible to watch.  That perspective fails to grasp the awful reality that, no matter how bad things are, they can always get worse. The Nets are 9-38, not 0-47. They’re 28th and 29th on offense and defense, not dead last in both. They lose by an average of 9.1 points per game, not an average of 15, 20, or 25.

So, in trading Lopez, the Nets do need to consider how they can make things better: but they cannot simply accept any deal on the table just to get the deal done — that may make things WORSE.  Trading Lopez for four first round picks would be great! Trading him for the 50th pick in the draft and cash considerations would no nothing but make the Nets’ situation worse.

Do I want the Nets to trade Lopez. Yes, I do: let’s start there as a baseline. The Nets are 2 years away at best from even being decent, and more than that from being contenders.  By the time they are ready to win, Lopez will be in his early to mid 30’s, and past his prime.  So he would be a smaller cog for them, or a piece they move on from — for little return value.  Dealing him NOW, however, MAXIMIZES his value to the Nets by providing pieces they can grow with around their other young pieces — pieces that will peak or be peaking when Lopez hits those mid 30’s.  It is easy to hope for free agents to pair with Lopez, but in 2016, they tried to sign RFA’s and compete for UFA’s to that affect — due to their record, it did not work.  Why should things be different now given the 9-38 record?

Of course, there are only three points in time at which the Nets can deal Lopez — this 2017 trade deadline, the summer of 2017, or the 2018 trade deadline.

Preliminarily, the Nets likely cannot wait until the 2018 deadline and likely need to deal Lopez before next season.  By the 2018 deadline, with just 2 months on his deal, Lopez will lose substantial value as a “rental”.  However, if you deal for Lopez now he’s yours for 1.4 seasons (the deadline is beyond the halfway mark)  If you wait for the summer, you get a full season with him, him in your training camp, and thus substantial time with him.

Accordingly, the Nets can deal Lopez now, or wait for the summer, waiting for the summer will not affect his value. 

However, unless the Nets are floored by an offer now (in which case, you take it and run), there is no reason not to at least see if someone will floor you in the summer.  This premise, from some fans, that the Nets “must trade Lopez right now, at all costs, because they have struggled for years” could not be more misguided.  The goal in trading Lopez is simple: it’s about maximizing the return, not doing the deal as soon as possible to shake things up. 
The Nets have the luxury not to rush because they will be bad for a while no matter what.  Whether they deal Lopez now, or in the summer of 2017, the Nets will be awful this year regardless, and likely be bad in 2017-2018 regardless.  So why rush?  The return package is infinitely more important than the date the deal is consummated.

In addition, a look at the 37 first round pick trades either consummated since 2013-2014 or for which picks are still owed to other teams, reflects that, for the Nets, patience, and operating from a position of strength that “we will do this when the return package suits us”, rather than rushing to get the deal done, will result in a MUCH better return package.

The deals, as listed below, are organized into two categories: deals made in the summer and deals made during the year. With 19 summer deals and 18 in season deals, it is true that there is no basis to believe that teams do not deal picks in season.  

More important, as discussed below, are the terms of these deals.  The deals are organized by deals won by the team getting the pick (that would be the Nets in a Lopez deal), and the team getting the player or players.
One trend clearly emerges: trades are often not balanced because teams become desperate to “achieve” an objective. Find a team that, due to a circumstance they are desperate to resolve in the short term, is willing to overpay. Then exploit that team. 

Here is the list of 37 trades made of players for picks:

I. DEALS MADE DURING THE SUMMER (19 deals)

A. Deals arguably won by the team getting picks

Boston and Brooklyn (2013): Kevin Garnett and Paul Pierce for 2014, 2016, and 2018 firsts, and a 2017 first rounder swap.

New York and Toronto (2013): Andrea Bargnani for a 2016 first rounder and multiple inconsequential pieces

Chicago and Cleveland (2013): Luol Deng for a first round pick, a right to swap a second first round pick, and Andrew  Bynum

Sacramento and Cleveland (2011): JJ Hickson for a 2017 first (top 10 protected)

Boston, Brooklyn, and Cleveland (2014): Jarrett Jack to Brooklyn, Tyler Zeller, Marcus Thornton, and a Cleveland first to Boston, the rights to international pieces who won’t come over to Cleveland. This was the first Boston used on Isaiah Thomas

Indiana and Phoenix (2013): Luis Scola for Gerald Green, Miles Plumlee, and a 2014 lottery protected first.

Philadelphia and Sacramento (2015): Carl Landry and a 2015 first and future first round swap, to Philadelphia for the rights to overseas players who will not come over.

Milwaukee and LA Clippers (2014): Jared Dudley and 2014 first rounder (lottery protected) to Milwaukee for essentially nothing in return.

Houston and LA Lakers (2014): Jeremy Lin and a first rounder for an international piece who will never come over.

Denver and Houston (2015): Ty Lawson for a protected 2016 first.

Brooklyn and Indiana (2016): Thaddeus Young for a first rounder, used on Caris LeVert

New Orleans, Houston, and Washington (2014): Pelicans’ 2015 first rounder to Houston with Trevor Ariza, Omer Asik and Omri Casspi to New Orleans, Melvin Ely to Washington.

Toronto and Milwaukee (2015): Greivis Vasquez for a protected 2015 first

LA Lakers and Phoenix and Orlando (2012): for acquiring Dwight Howard and Steve Nash, the Lakers owe a 2017 first to Phoenix, and 2019 first to Orlando

New Orleans and Philadelphia (2013): Jrue Holiday for a 2013 first rounder (predetermined to be Nerlens Noel), and a 2014 first rounder which became Dario Saric

Boston and LA Clippers (2013): Doc Rivers as coach for a 2015 first round pick

B. Deals arguably won by the team getting players

Cleveland, Minnesota, and Philadelphia: Kevin Love for Andrew Wiggins; Thaddeus Young to Minnesota; 2015 first rounder from Cleveland to Philadelphia

Golden State and Utah (2013): Andre Iguoadala for 2014 and 2017 first round picks

 

Atlanta, Utah, and Indiana (2016): Jeff Teague to the Hawks, George Hill to the Pacers, the 12th pick from the Jazz to the Hawks (used on Taurean Prince).

 

II. DEALS MADE DURING THE REGULAR SEASON (18 deals)

A. Deals Won By the Team Getting Picks

Boston and Dallas (2014): Rajon Rondo and Dwight Powell, for Jae Crowder and Brandan Wright, and a 2015 first.

Sacramento and Philadelphia: 2017 first round pick and Nik Stauskas for an overseas pick never to come over.

Miami and Phoenix (2015): Goran Dragic for 2017 and 2021 firsts.

Sacramento and Oklahoma City: Jerami Grant for Ersan Ilyasova and 2020 top 20 protected pick.

Phoenix, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia (2015): 2015 first to Philadelphia (that Lakers lottery pick), Brandon Knight to Phoenix, Michael Carter-Williams, Miles Plumlee, Tyler Ennis to Milwaukee

Portland and Denver (2015): Arron Afflalo for Will Barton and a 2016 first round pick

Philadelphia and Denver (2015): JaVale McGee and a 2015 first to Philadelphia for the rights to a player never coming over.

Memphis and LA Clippers (2016): Jeff Green for a first round pick.

Boston, Memphis, and New Orleans (2015): Boston gets Tayshaun Price, Austin Rivers, and a Memphis first, Memphis gets Jeff Green, New Orleans gets Quincy Pondexter

Atlanta and Minnesota (2015): Adreian Payne for a 2018 lottery protected first.

Boston and Phoenix (2015): Brandon Wright for a 2015 first round pick

Cleveland and Portland (2016): Anderson Varejao and a first round pick for a second round pick (for flexibility to subsequently trade for Channing Frye — really both teams won at Orlando’s expense)

B. Deals Won By the Team Getting Players

Boston and Phoenix (2015): Isaiah Thomas for Cleveland’s 2016 first round pick.

Oklahoma City, New York, and Cleveland (2015): Dion Waiters to OKC, a Thunder first to Cleveland with Iman Shumpert and JR Smith, Lance Thomas and filler to NYK.

Utah, Oklahoma City, and Detroit: Reggie Jackson to Detroit, Enes Kanter to OKC, 2017 first rounder to Utah.

Washington and Phoenix (2016): Markieff Morris for a first round pick, top 9 protected.

Cleveland and Denver (2015): Timofey Mozgov for two protected 2015 firsts.

Cleveland and Atlanta (2017): Kyle Korver for a 2019 top 10 protected first round pick).

 

Now, what are the takeaways from this list?  

Takeaway 1: You should not buy the idea that the new CBA will make teams fear pick deals.  Remember: last CBA spiked the luxury tax, and led to an inundation of articles purporting that teams would value the draft, and avoid dealing picks.  Nevertheless, we still saw PLENTY of pick trades.  I did not even include trades where teams traded down in the draft, sometimes as much as 20 places, for nothing but cash, or second rounders years into the future with heavy protections.  The bottom line: for various reasons, teams always have traded first rounders, and they always will. Sometimes an owner has a win now mandate.  Sometimes a GM needs to save his job, overvalues a player, or undervalues the draft.  Sometimes a team just wants that one extra piece for that year’s playoff run. Sometimes a team just wants to save some money.  Despite the 2011 CBA purportedly causing high valuation of first rounders, we saw the trades above. Teams SENDING first rounders to dump contracts like Carl Landry and Jared Dudley.  Jeff Green and Dion Waiters fetching firsts.  And on from there. You can deal for first round picks. Period.

Takeaway 2: These deals are all over the map.  It is almost impossible to define the “market” for a first round pick.  Isaiah Thomas brought in one first. So did JJ Hickson. Timofey Mozgov (despite protections) fetched two.  Brandon Knight fetched a high lottery pick, while Jeremy Lin was conveyed WITH a first rounder to a franchise.  These deals cannot be plotted onto a graph to reflect a “market value” for Lopez.  And that is the big point for the Nets.

Essentially, what dictates the value exchanged in player for pick deals is not the worth of the pick or the player.
 

THAT IS THE KEY – all of these player for pick trades are unrelated to one another, and the winner or loser was determined by the relative desperation level of the franchises involved in the deal.  A general rule emerges: THE MORE DESPERATE YOU ARE, THE WORSE YOU DO IN THE DEAL.  Conversely, the LESS desperate you are, the more leverage you have and the better you do. The Nets, with the luxury of knowing they will be bad for a while, should act with no desperation and try to find teams desperate for an upgrade, then exploit them.

Let’s pick some examples out.  We know the Celtics fleeced the Nets in the Garnett-Pierce deal.  Why?  Because the Nets were desperate to win, immediately, and that desperation fueled them to overpay.  Second, the Knicks were desperate to win now and build on 2013 when they traded a 2016 first rounder for Andrea Bargnani.

Less local examples are prevalent.  The Cavs traded a first rounder for Luol Deng: that was awful given Deng’s decline and the 2014 Cavs’ struggles.  They also traded a first rounder and Tyler Zeller, AND Jarrett Jack in the Boston-Brooklyn-Cleveland deal, and received nothing in return!  Why do that, you ask? They wanted to impress LeBron with a winning season, then believed he was coming home.  Of course, things worked out, but at the time, those were awful moves, only forgotten and forgiven because LeBron returned.

Other desperation deals resulted in the team acquiring a pick fleecing the other side. The Clippers and Kings sent first round picks out just to get the Sixers and Bucks to take Carl Landry and Jared Dudley off their hands. The Rockets dumped Lin and a first rounder for nothing because that provided funds to make Chris Bosh an offer. The Clippers traded a first rounder for a coach because Chris Paul wanted that as a free agent.

All of these deals have a common thread: a team trading for a draft pick or picks fleeced a team trading for a player, because the team was desperate to obtain the player, for some reason or another.  — THAT is what the Nets need to shoot for in a Lopez deal.  Find that team desperate to acquire a good player, leverage the fact that you are in no rush to deal, and that if this falls through you will find something better, and use that leverage to get the best offer possible.

That is not something you accomplish when you say “we need to make the trade now because we have been waiting for years.” Rather, as the flip side of the coin shows, being in a rush to sell a player, for some reason, results in a short sale, or sale for low value — PRECISELY WHAT THE NETS MUST AVOID.

 In this regard, the Nets should take heed of multiple cautionary tales.  In 2015, the Phoenix Suns, not understanding how point guards think of their domain as the ball handler, just assumed that Goran Dragic, Isaiah Thomas, and Eric Bledsoe all playing together would not result in bad chemistry when all 3 wanted to lead.  The Suns were filled with in house bickering and feuding, as the 3 point guards could not bare the situation.

The Suns could have waited and taken their time, to ensure that any trades they made resulted in good return value.  However, the Suns were desperate. They wanted to get rid of their tri headed mess, and save face publicly.  The result?  They rushed the Thomas trade, acquiring nothing but Cleveland’s 2016 pick (which figured to be low in the draft as LBJ was already a Cav).  That trade has become a huge steal for Boston.  The Suns should not have rushed the deal, and by rushing, by saying it HAD TO get done now, they short sold.  Waiting 6-12 months to deal Thomas and getting actual value would have been much better for the Suns.

Phoenix is not the only team that has done this over the years. The Dallas Mavericks, needing a perceived boost in 2015, threw caution to the wind in dealing Jae Crowder for Rajon Rondo.  That worked out well, didn’t it?  The Hawks, time pressured internally by Dennis Schroeder getting extended, essentially dumped Jeff Teague for Taurean Prince.

 

Bottom line: If you think about the disparate value in the last four seasons of pick for player deals, you find a common thread.  The teams winning the deals often are teams in no rush to get a deal done, but who are simply collecting players or assets.  The teams losing these deals are the desperate teams that feel like they HAVE TO get something done, and get it done as soon as possible.  That leads to those teams overpaying for what they want, and struggling down the road.

The Nets, under Billy King, were notorious for being the team that lost these deals, because, in the desperation to do something, RIGHT HERE RIGHT NOW, they overpaid in deals, by dealing from a position of weakness.  They had to get Gerald Wallace for Damian Lillard in a rush to keep Deron Williams. They HAD to infuse leadership and build the brand in the Boston deal. And on and on and on.

The Nets should avoid this “get it down now” approach with Lopez and, for once, be the team that deals from a position of strength.  It matters not if you deal him today, or in June July or August.  So why rush?  Be patient.  Find that desperate team who feels Lopez is a missing piece for them.  That team willing to overpay, desperate to make a splash or boost a playoff run or sell some tickets.

And if you do not find that team in February? So be it. Keep Lopez. Proceed to July. Find a team telling itself “we need a free agency upgrade and this is our best chance at one,” and leverage assets that way.

Just get the best return value possible.

 

 

 

 

 

It was the fall of 2010.  The (then) New Jersey Nets were trying to acquire Carmelo Anthony from the Denver Nuggets.  The news was filled with rumors of potential deals, offers, calls between Billy King and Masai Ujiri and third team involvement.

Next, it was the fall of 2011.  All of the above happened, this time with Dwight Howard.

Under Billy King, the Nets operated, likely deliberately, as a leaky ship.  The school of thought surrounding that approach is two fold.

First, by spreading a combination of information and misinformation, you can, in theory, gain leverage on the market.  Maybe you make a good trade with Phoenix because they were worried about the rumored offer made by Sacramento.

Second, by leaking information, you keep fans invested in your product.  Almost all of what a GM does to build a contender is done behind the scenes, unbeknownst to fans.  GM’s do not send fans their season ticket invoice with a time sheet detailing things like “telephone call made to Grizzlies involving availability of Tony Allen,” or anything of the sort.  Accordingly, unless a trade happens, or is leaked, there is no tangible evidence, to a fan, that their GM is working his butt off.  The reality, however, is that a GM can be putting in 80 hour weeks, despite not getting any deals done, between scouting, assessment and valuation, long term planning, calls, and the like.  Some GM’s presumably, leak information so that fans can think “he’s working hard! I like him!”

Nevertheless, there is value in not being a leaky ship, and in withholding information.

When information leaks, that allows other teams to know what you are doing, or at least infer what you may be doing.  The less your adversaries know of your plans — whether those plans be to make a trade or to sit a player who is injured — the better. There is absolutely a large amount of value in keeping information internal.  If I know you will start a player who is questionable to injury, I can plan for him.  If I know you are shopping Brook Lopez and what you are looking for, I can swoop in and meet your price (you can demand more if your price is a secret), or I can offer teams a comparably valued player and steal the trade for myself.

The Spurs are notorious for operating in secrecy, rather than being transparent with the media and with fans: http://voiceglance.com/what-businesses-can-learn-from-the-san-antonio-spurs/.

In reality, there is nothing wrong with being a leaky ship OR with acting in secrecy.  Often, media judge these behaviors based on a team’s win-loss record, rather than the merit of the strategy.  For example, as for being a leaky ship, the Celtics are absolutely notorious for letting their business go public.  Since the Celtics have been successful, however, the general reaction to this is “the Celtics are smart to leak trades for leverage! That’s how they acquire the best value. What a good organization.”  Yet, while Billy King’s leak strategy was essentially similar, it did not work and the Nets are unsuccessful, so the reaction to the same tactics becomes “what a dysfunctional organization. They can’t keep anything internal and leaked all kinds of crazy things.”

The same unfair characterizations have occurred with secretive franchises.  When a team like the Spurs, or the notoriously secretive New England Patriots, are tight-lipped, since they are incredibly successful, the school of thought is “what great organizations. Great franchises keep things internal and do not leak misinformation to drive their agenda.” Nevertheless, when the Sixers recently employed the SAME tactics under Sam Hinkie, the idea became “why are they so hush about everything.  Where is the transparency with the fans!”

In short, there is nothing wrong with being tight-lipped as an organization, and many incredibly successful franchises are.

The Nets?  They are tight-lipped under Sean Marks in many ways.

Check out this article – and this article – about how high Kenny Atkinson and Sean Marks were on Thaddeus Young this May and June.  When Marks and Atkinson were hired, you did not see a slew of articles like “sources: Nets shopping Thaddeus Young” or “sources: Nets engage with 3 teams on Thaddeus Young and target player X in a package,” or the like.  Rather, the Nets spoke highly of him, and then things went quiet.

Then, out of nowhere, Thad was traded, absent any real leak storm. All there was was a Adrian Wojnarowski Tweet (in the link) regarding Thad potentially going to a team in the West- but he was then dealt to the East’s Indiana Pacers.

The Thad trade should have been a lesson for Nets fans: the new Nets operate in a tight-lipped, secretive manner.  Sean Marks sees value in withholding information from fans, the media, and other teams, because of the inherent advantage in there being an information gap in your favor.  As a result, public comments the Nets have, as to how much they like players, plans on the trade market, or the like, should be dismissed by fans as “GM speak.”

The Nets, after all, were incredibly complimentary of Thad in the above links.  A comparison to Paul Millsap?  Thad as a leader?  That is SERIOUS praise…but the Nets still traded him.

Accordingly, it does not matter if the Nets say that Brook Lopez is playing very well and doing everything they ask of him.  Or if they say that they love the way Sean Kilpatrick is developing.  Or if they appreciate Bojan Bogdanovic as a high character man.  All of those things may be true!  But that does not mean the Nets will not deal those pieces.

And, as we saw with Thad, do not be surprised if those players (or any Nets for that matter) are on the roster one moment, then not on it when you check your Twitter feed five minutes later.

Which Brings Us to Jeremy Lin: Is the Nets Radio Silence Okay?

During a November 2 game against the Pistons, Jeremy Lin was pulled with a hamstring issue — we were told Lin would be out for 2 weeks and would then be reevaluated with a hamstring strain.

It should be noted that, by the report’s explicit terms, Lin did not miss more time than expected, as all that was reported was he would be reevaluated in 2 weeks.  The Nets released factually accurate information on Lin.

However, it is clear that while the information the Nets released was factually accurate, it was also vague, and lacking much substance.  The Nets under Marks closely evaluate player health and performance, and do not want to go public with much of that information.  At the surface here with Lin is that very fact.

Indeed, Lin missed 17 games over 40 days after the 2 week reevaluation announcement.  Flashing forward, Lin has now missed 31 games since the announcement (one game was not for the hamstring).  After the 17 missed games, Lin reinjured the hamstring, and the Nets shared that the injury was less severe this time around.  Lin has already missed 13 games, close to the 17 of last time: less severe was a factually accurate description, but is a relative term. Indeed, if a $500,000 purchase of a diamond is cut to $499,000, your spending is “less severe.”

Essentially, with regard to Lin’s injury, the Nets took the same stance they took with dealing Thad Young: rather than be open books, or leak information, they were secretive, and guarded about what the public sees.  The Nets — right or wrong — see an advantage in being hush about Lin’s status.

The Nets’ quiet necessarily creates two questions.  First, is it appropriate?  Second, is it appropriate for fans to question it.

First, it IS APPROPRIATE, in all respects, for the Nets to elect to be hush about Lin’s injury status.  The Nets have been factually accurate in their minimal public reporting, and there is no obligation for them to do more.  There is also, as discussed above, an advantage to being tight lipped.  Other teams can be unsure if Lin is a go.  If any of the Nets performance team, proprietary data, biometric or otherwise, has anything to say about Lin’s hamstring, there is an advantage to keeping that data completely confidential.  What if releasing information helps other teams know what the data says and helps them learn about the Nets approach to player health?  What if the data has the Nets believing the Nets should deal Lin?  We, and teams, have no way of knowing – and the Nets are reasonable to do all they can to keep it that way. Some teams may have elected, given Lin’s amount of missed time, to provide some information to assuage fans.  But that does not change the result (the player is still sitting); the Nets choice NOT to do that is more than fine.

Second – and on the other hand – it is ALSO APPROPRIATE for fans to question the Nets in this regard.  Sure, when a team like the Spurs, or Patriots, is tight lipped and experiences massive success, fans buy in.  They assume the tight lipped nature of the franchise is good, because hey, the results are there.

But the Nets — in all due fairness — have not earned that type of buy in from their fans — not yet.  While Marks and Atkinson have been great (I trust them completely) and the teams’ failures should be laid at Billy King’s and Mikhail Prokhorov’s feet for prior moves, the Nets are 9-34, with a slew of picks out of their control.  Fans invest significantly in the franchise, with their money and their time.  They have a right, given those investments, to question the franchise, worry about its direction, and wonder, given the record and outlook, if it will ever get better.  Even if, on the merits alone, they should not be so worried, they have the right to be.

With that, when you tell your fans that your second best player’s strained hamstring will cause him to be out 2 weeks pending reevaluation, after a “less severe” reinjury, the player has missed 30 games with the injury, and your response is to go silent on the issue, fans are going to have some questions.  Fans of all ages will question: do I want to invest my money and my time, both of which are in finite supply, in or on this product?

Would the Nets being more open about their plans with players, leaking trade rumors, and updating the status of an injured player like Lin, assuage these questions?  Not fully.  But, arguably, more information flow may reduce the concerns those fans have.

The Sean Marks led Nets are tight lipped.  That is their choice, that makes them have something in common with some great organizations, and that is NOT a problem. 

But fans have a right to question that approach.

 

 

The 2017 NBA trade deadline is coming before we know it. 37 days stand between us, and the “other side.”

With the Nets losing so regularly, it can be tempting to hope the Nets make wholesale changes, just to do something to spruce things up.  However, change is not always good — and change for the worse is more harmful than good.  The Nets need assets, and need to dig out of the hole the previous regime but them in — not dig further in.  Any move that digs them further in is not a move to do.  In addition, as every player on the roster only can be traded once, it is critical to <strong>maximize </strong>the return, to speed the dig out.  Not getting enough in a trade prolongs the rebuild in that regard.

As for the idea things cannot get worse?  They always can.  You can always lose more than you currently do, lose by more points, or have an even lesser asset pool than you currently have.

So what the Nets face, essentially, is an extremely fluid situation.  On one hand, there is no need to make ANY roster changes, if the return makes the Nets’ situation worse.  There is no need to deal Brook Lopez for a bad return and miss the chance to get a better return later.  There is no need to waive Quincy Acy for that matter, if the roster spot cannot be filled by a better player, or made useful in a deal of a larger piece.

At the same time, no Nets player is untouchable.  The Nets hole is DEEP, and will take years to escape.  No Net, at this moment, is a “foundational” player — a player you build a roster around. Accordingly, no Net is untradeable.  The flip side of “do not deal any Net if the deal is bad,” is “deal ANY Net if the deal is good.”  Indeed, ANY Net, from Lopez and LeVert to Dinwiddie and Acy, is touchable . . . but only at the appropriate price.

This brings me to my last point: trade value is relative and contextual.  Given the Nets’ situation, they DESPERATELY need draft picks and young talent.  Accordingly, the bit of young talent they actually have is EXTREMELY important for them to keep.  As a result, a player like LeVert, or Rondae Hollis-Jefferson, may have a particular trade value in a vacuum, but the Nets should charge MORE than that if dangling them in deals, because of their relative importance to the Nets.

With that, what price should the Nets demand for their players?  Here is the list, organized by minutes per game.

Brook Lopez:

-Why trade him: He will be 28 in April and is at his peak.  He likely will begin to dip 2-3 years from now — right when the Nets are perhaps starting to get ready to compete.  So he is optimized by getting youthful value for then, right now, not by keeping him. If the Nets are to restock the cupboard he is the ONLY piece that can do it.

-Why keep him: The return.  Lopez is the Nets’ top asset: once they deal him, they will be hard pressed to add more to their asset pool.  It is CRITICAL to get good value for him.  If the offers are bad, there is no reason to deal Lopez at a loss.  Waiting to the draft, when teams know their pick, how they value each prospect and what others may do may yield a better return.

-The price: A lottery pick, or a mid round first and an established young player. In recent pick deals, George Hill and Jeff Teague were swapped for the 12th pick, Thaddeus Young the 20th pick.  A Lopez market should be set accordingly.

Trevor Booker:

-Why trade him: He is a useful veteran multiple contenders can use.  He is also 29, and will be an age 30 vet next season relying on athleticism which can get dicey.

-Why keep him: There is value to having vets around a rebuild.  If you have a full roster of kids, then you have no role model for those kids to grow from.  A vet who has seen a lot, knows what it takes to win, and teaches good habits has value to helping young players develop, in all sports.  Booker is a great example for this group. He is also on a fair market value deal.

-The price: An unprotected second rounder in the 30-40 range, or a decent young player a contender is giving up on.  Booker is not worth much on the market but can fetch Brooklyn a small time asset.

Sean Kilpatrick:

-Why trade him: He is at his best with the ball in his hands, which calls into question whether he can fit as a complementary part on a good team.  He is also 27, so it is tough to believe that he will get any better than he is now.  A future asset may be more helpful.

-Why keep him: He will make the league minimum next year and will be a productive pro while doing it. When hot, he can be lethal from the perimeter, and he is talented enough to swing a playoff game in a team’s favor one day if he catches fire. He is also shooting 41.8% this year on wide open threes and can get more of those on a better team.

-The price: An unprotected second rounder in the 30-40 range, or a decent young player a contender is giving up on.  This may not seem like a lot, but you are not getting a first rounder for Kilpatrick.  You just are not.  At the same time, this also may show why keeping him may be the better plan: the likelihood of a 30-40 range pick outperforming Kilpatrick is not high.

Bojan Bogdanovic:

-Why trade him: He is slated to be a free agent and make $10-$15 million per season, as a wing who: 1: cannot defend, in a league where it is critical to have multiple wings who can; 2: is not a good scorer off the bounce and figures to find a home on a good team as a role playing spotup shooter.

-Why keep him: Bogdanovic is shooting 41.2% on wide open threes, 37% from 3 for the season, and has shown in his 3 seasons that he can fit on a good team as a role playing seventh man.

-The price: A late first round pick.  This is an example of where the market has to dictate your plan.  Bojan being traded for nothing, or leaving as a free agent, provides no value. Getting an asset is great, but if not, the Nets should keep him and look to flip him later.

Jeremy Lin:

-Why trade him: He is 27 years old, and reliant on his quick first two steps.  If those go, he goes, and the Nets may not be good while he has those quick steps.

-Why keep him: For starters, given all the missed time, the Nets would NEVER get fair value.  More critically, the Nets are clearly better when Lin plays, and hard pressed to find talent like him.  He leads the team in dribble drives by a country mile, and the Nets’ probe the paint with guards offensive attack is infinitely better when he plays.  He is that much better than Whitehead and Dinwiddie, which boosts the attack to that affect, and boosts the team by putting everyone in the place they should be in.

-The price: A lottery pick, or mid first and solid young player.  This price is too steep for Lin and it will mean he will not be traded.  But given his importance to the Nets attack as a “head of the snake” point guard, he is too important to deal for less.  The Nets’ struggles attracting free agents are necessarily a factor in that as well.

Joe Harris:

-Why trade him: Older draft picks often do not develop, and Harris is already 25 and in year 3, the typical breakout year: he is underwhelming.  That Harris is shooting just 36% on wide open threes, when his entire role is as a shooter, is concerning.  An asset beats retaining Harris.

-Why keep him: He is a shooter on a team short on shooters and if he takes another developmental step he could become a low end rotation piece.

-The price: An early to mid second rounder, or a throw in in a Lopez or Bogdanovic trade.  If Harris brings in an asset, that should suffice for his services.  In addition, if the Nets find a good deal for Brook or Bojan and the opposing team wants Harris, he should not hold a deal up.

Isaiah Whitehead:

-Why trade him: Whitehead has not shown that, as a point guard, he actually has point guard skills.  He makes poor decisions overall and does not run the offense efficiently.

-Why keep him: Whitehead has been good for a mid second rounder.  He has an eclectic skillset, including the ability to block shots, nice passing ability, and potential as a defender.  Given his cheap contract, he can fit going forward even in a tiny role.  He is not a competent rotation player right now but he can be.

-The price: A late first round pick. Again, context comes into play here.  The Nets are so youth starved that they cannot deal their youth unless a team overpays them for it.

Rondae Hollis-Jefferson:

-Why trade him: If the Nets do not see him as a core part, getting value now beats waiting for his extension year.  RHJ may never be a shooter at a position where shooting is critical to future success.

-Why keep him: RHJ is so clearly an incredibly hard working young player, with a bright attitude.  When he struggles, it is often the result of pressing to perform, to show “I worked hard on this and now I am good at it.” His defense has huge upside, and he is developing as a playmaker in the pick and roll. He is a vital future piece.

-The price: A mid first round pick and another solid young player: This is a ransom for RHJ, but goes to the point I have made — the Nets need more guys like him, not less, so they should not deal unless a team overpays.

Justin Hamilton:

-Why trade him: Hamilton is 26 going on 27.  And despite being billed as a sweet shooting big, he is only shooting 35% on open threes.  He is a surprisingly adept shot blocker but not a good defender overall.  A contender may see him as an extra stretch shooting big with usefulness: Hamilton can be a sneaky piece to grab an asset for.

-Why keep him: Hamilton should be more or less what he is now for the next few years, and stretch bigs are not easy to come by, as well as useful in Atkinson’s wide open system.

-The price: An early to mid second rounder.  If the Nets can get an asset for Hamilton, they should stock the cupboard.

Spencer Dinwiddie:

-Why trade him: Dinwiddie is barely a NBA player despite multiple chances.  The Nets cannot go forward with him and Whitehead; they need more talent.

-Why keep him: He is developing in their system and if Lin or Whitehead go, he can take some of their minutes.

-The price: A mid second rounder or a throw in in a larger deal.  If Dinwiddie brings in a pick, the Nets should jump at the offer.  In addition, if the Nets strike a bigger deal, he should not be an impediment.

Caris LeVert:

-Why trade him: Frankly, there is no reason to, unless someone gets crazy with an offer (remember: no player is untouchable, players simply vary in price).

-Why keep him: LeVert is not that good yet, but has significant potential.  He sees the floor.  He creates for others.  He is versatile.  He rebounds.  He can drive, shoot, pass and defend, which wings today need to do. He is also a high character man.  LeVert is the Nets best future piece.

-The price: A lottery pick and a good young player: this is a deal no team would do with the Nets.  Given their situation, however, LeVert is SO important that he can only be dealt in an overpay.

Randy Foye and Luis Scola:

-Why trade them: They are not future pieces.  Any asset the Nets can get, they should take . . . subject to making sure the roster is not COMPLETELY stripped of veteran leadership.

-Why keep them: Only to ensure the team does not have 0 veterans.

-The price: a late second rounder.  Foye and Scola have no value.  Any asset acquired is a bonus.

Quincy Acy:

-Why trade him: He may not even make it past today in any event, but he has no real value.  Any asset for him is a bargain.

-Why keep him: If no deals surface, and he is better than anyone NOT in the NBA, there is no reason to dump him.

-The price: a late second rounder.

Chris McCullough:

-Why trade him: Injuries aside, we are through 1.5 seasons of McCullough’s career and three coaches have now felt he is not NBA ready.  Will he ever be?  If not, the time to get value for him is NOW, before he graduates from the rookie scale and teams catch on to his lack of value.

-Why keep him: He may not bring anything back in a deal, and he has shown flashes in the D League.

-The price: Two unprotected second rounders.  It is what it is, but McCullough is not bringing more than this back in a deal.

The Nets are 8-28.  Whether you believe in their new front office or not, one thing is true: the Nets are a tough team to watch on a night in, night out basis.  Are the Nets a perfect organization?  By no means.  If one is being honest in their assessment, it would be tough to argue that any team in the league is in a worse position, from an asset and talent perspective, than the Nets are.

At the same time, fans have a tendency to be myopic, and view everything regarding a NBA franchise through the prism of its record.  The Nets are simultaneously 8-28 with an asset deficiency, and a roster full of hopes, rather than rotation players: that is awful.  But just because the Nets are 8-28, does not mean that everything they are doing is bad.  Great teams have weaknesses, and, yes, awful teams have strengths.

The Nets two strengths? Sean Marks and Kenny Atkinson.

On Kenny Atkinson:

It is always easy, when a team loses basketball games, to point fingers at the coaching staff from the couch (or the bar, arena, etc.).  But those fingers are not warranted with Atkinson.

If any team is going to build a champion, that team needs to construct a modern offensive system.  Modern offenses are not built around the post ups and isolation type basketball typical of the Nets prior to Atkinson’s arrival.  Modern offenses shoot the 3.  Modern offenses rely on the dribble drive to open up and space the floor.  Modern offenses push the ball.

Atkinson has brought the Nets into the 21st century (or really, into the last eight years).  They are third in the lead in three pointers attempted, and first in pace.  Their offense, when Lin is healthy, is built around Lin probing for creases and setting himself or others up for shots.  They top the league in pace. They are second in the league in drives to the basket. This article does an amazing job detailing the numbers: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fancy-stats/wp/2017/01/03/the-nets-are-the-worst-team-in-the-nba-but-theyre-playing-like-a-playoff-team/?utm_term=.a3df6e3038b4

Critically, Brook Lopez took just 31 threes before this year.  He’s taken 166 this year, and hits at a fair 36.1% clip.  Developing bigs into three point shooters is something modern, successful franchises do.

The Nets lose. A lot. But they absolutely play basketball the right way; the way contenders play.  They just do not get the results contenders get, because of the talent.

Some are critical of Atkinson as related to the high volume of threes and their style, especially given the Nets are a terrible 28th in the NBA in three point shooting percentage.  The thought is that Atkinson is not maximizing his players and squeezing the most he can out of them — something which would help them win as much as they can.

As a factual point, that Atkinson is not maximizing this roster is true.  This 8-28 team could be something like 10-26, perhaps, if Atkinson stopped allowing his bad young shooters to take threes, stopped allowing Hollis-Jefferson to drive to the basket, and the like.

But what good would come out of that?  The goal right now is to begin the process of building a contender.  And the idea of Atkinson installing a system he wants to win with in the playoffs now, is a simple one: some of these players are going to be along for the ride.  Assume that, if the Nets are a playoff team in 3 years, the team has LeVert, Whitehead, Kilpatrick, and Hamilton (for the sake of argument).  There is infinitely more value in those players — and players acquired next year and the year after — to be accustomed to Atkinson’s system, than for them to have to reintegrate every year into a system that fits that year’s personnel.

Quite simply, there is no point of Atkinson focusing his system on THIS roster — most of these players are not going to be here when he is coaching his first contender in Brooklyn.  It is more important to establish the system going forward so that the players kept going forward are familiar with it.

Lastly, there has been some criticism of Atkinson in being so liberal with his minutes distribution.  And it should be noted that Atkinson likely would squeeze a couple more wins from this roster if he simply played Lopez, Booker, Bogdanovic, Lin (when healthy) and whoever has the hot hand that night a ton of minutes, and froze out the rest of the roster.

But what good does that do.  Once again, no matter what Atkinson does, this roster is one built to lose between 55 and 70 games, depending on health and future trades.  Maximizing this particular group has no benefit.

By playing everyone on the roster a lot of minutes — and by putting everyone on the roster into clutch situations, Atkinson is ensuring the most important thing he can ensure — that the Nets get a complete look at all of their young players so that they can know what they can do, what they cannot do, and what they cannot do but can improve at.  That is why you see Bogdanovic guarding Jimmy Butler on a late game play, or Dinwiddie playing endgame minutes, or Whitehead taking a technical free throw in the fourth quarter.  The exposure to those moments boosts development and maximizes evaluation.

Atkinson is forward thinking and is doing a good job.

On Sean Marks:

Sean Marks inherited a 21-61 team with the above asset depletion — and that depletion was even larger last year given the Nets 2016 first rounder also went to Boston.

If anyone expected Marks to fix the Nets by this point in time, they had unreasonable expectations.  Sure, every GM should be evaluated, and that includes Marks.  At the same time, GM’s cannot simply be evaluated by team record in a vacuum.  The picture inherited by the GM relative to where they are must be a factor. And anytime a GM inherits a team this far in the hole, from an asset perspective, the GM cannot actually get anything done until the GM, first, cleans up the mess the last GM made.

No GM can be judged solely on moves.  How is the GM’s plan?  How is his understanding of the human element of team building?  Does he embrace analytics?  What culture is he installing?  And, yes, how are his moves.

Going just on moves, Marks has done fine.  Hired five hours before the trade deadline, nobody can possibly fault Marks for not making deals at the deadline.  A GM must look at every aspect of the roster carefully, and assess the market by speaking with other GM’s, over months of time.  Marks would have been stupid to do something dramatic at the deadline. He bought out Joe Johnson to take care of him, which was smart because players and agents talk.

Given the weak 2016 NBA Draft, Caris LeVert and Isaiah Whitehead have performed just fine; Marks did well in the draft.  Jeremy Lin, despite injuries, was a steal at his contract number and is a boost, both in showing the Nets can obtain free agents, and showing the Nets are heading in the right direction.  He has also helped the team’s young players when he has played.  Sean Kilpatrick was an excellent 10 day contract find.  Justin Hamilton has performed acceptably.  Trevor Booker is a perfect example for the kids, and his fierce competitive fire defines the culture being built. Joe Harris has not been a bad addition.

Lastly, the offer sheets to Allen Crabbe and Tyler Johnson were thwarted, but were smart.  They show players and agents the Nets are headed in the right direction (remember: people talk), and put the Nets in the room with a credible shot with better talent than the UFA market permits.

Marks is not perfect.  Randy Foye and Luis Scola have underwhelmed, while Greivis Vasquez literally broke down. Nevertheless, all three players were plan C’s, signed to be veteran leaders, not to actually provide production. In addition, while I like Thad for LeVert as a concept, the Nets cannot proclaim victory in that trade until a day comes where Caris is the better player — that day will not come this year. The trade, while sensible, was a risk.

Going beyond the player acquisitions, however, Marks has done s much that should excite fans. For starters, Marks has not taken any shortcuts in building this franchise.  Check out the scope of the front office: http://www.netsdaily.com/2016/8/27/12669384/do-the-nets-have-the-biggest-front-office-in-the-nba

Marks has shown he understands the things that the best organizations understand.  The best organizations manage minutes in conjunction with their performance teams, and biometrics staffs.  The best organizations do not make decisions in insular fashion, without considering all perspectives.  We have consistently heard from Marks that when he makes decisions, he listens to everyone in the room.

Overall, the Nets are building a quality culture and infrastructure.  We have an all inclusive front office. We have a modern coaching staff.  We have players who shoot 3’s, play fast, and, like Trevor Booker, compete hard.

Sure, some of this may seem hollow to fans.  But the Nets, last year, hit rock bottom in many ways.  The losing was combined with a regressive manner of doing business.  Far more important than building an infrastructure, was headline grabbing, making a splash and winning more than the Knicks. Building an infrastructure matters: all good organizations have a good culture.  When you are 21-61 with no draft picks, no assets, and no culture of accountability, work ethic, or professionalism, you have to start with building those things first.

Things appear to be changing.  The Nets, in so many ways, are acting like the antithesis of a team looking to win the headline over building an infrastructure.  The offseason focus: targeting unheralded players, ignoring “names” like Dion Waiters, Rajon Rondo, or the like.  The GM and coach hire: relative unknowns.  Thaddeus Young for Caris LeVert? That sounds like anything but trying to win the headline. Sure, Lin is a splashy name, and Whitehead is a local kid.  But given Lin’s cheap contract number and Whitehead’s performance relative to draft position, it is tough to criticize either move.

The Nets, in their moves since February of 2016, have not prioritized beating the Knicks, or avoiding the optics of giving a top pick to Boston.  They have acted like a normal franchise.

The key? Impetuous owners are known, from time to time, to have patches of time where poor play shocks them into reasonable thinking.  Prokhorov, for 11 months, has been reasonable, has not been impulsive, and has positioned the Nets to do well once they get out from under their asset debt.

Marks and Atkinson have brought us a new Prokhorov for 11 months. Now, it must last.

 

 

 

 

Dirk Nowitzki, Tony Parker, Manu Ginobili, Nick Collison, Russell Westbrook, Udonis Haslem, Mike Conley, Mark Gasol, and Nikola Pekovic.

 

Brook Lopez has been a Net for longer (consecutively) than every other NBA player has been with his current team.  8.5 years of service.  Atop or nearly atop the franchise leaderboard in multiple statistical categories.  The sole remaining player from the team’s New Jersey history (for that matter, the sole Net remaining from the year Jason Kidd coached the team).

 

You may like Lopez.  You may dislike him.  But he has left a mark on the Nets.

 

Will this season be his last mark?

 

The Case Against Trading Brook Lopez

 

            The decision to trade Lopez is not as simple as meets the eye for Brooklyn.  For starters, the draft pick and asset situation, and its affect on player recruitment, shows why trading Lopez may not be ideal.  Given the Nets lack of assets, the ability to add top tier (or even middle tier) talent in the draft, or on the trade market, is simply not present.  You cannot build through the draft without lottery picks – the lottery is the place where the league’s best talents are available.  You can “find diamonds in the rough” like the Nets have with Sean Kilpatrick, and hopefully have with players like Caris LeVert.  But the likelihood outside of the lottery is strong that the acquired players simply will not become starters, let alone high level starters or stars.  The players just do not have the type of exponential growth potential seen in the lottery.

 

The lack of assets, together with the Nets record, hurt the Nets in free agency.  Recent free agency history shows us that the league’s stars, and high level starters, will make big money and have a large role wherever they choose to sign.  Accordingly, those factors cannot sway free agents, and free agent decisions are grounded in one core principle, for the most part: where can I win the most.  Unfortunately, the answer to that question is not “Brooklyn,” so the Nets were essentially unable to sign any impact free agent with free choice over his destination (that led to pursuing free agents who lack free choice given the false market – restricted free agents – and even then the Nets signed sixth men craving more).

 

In short, there is no path right now to the Nets acquiring players of Lopez’s caliber, but what the Nets need going forward are players of Lopez’s caliber and better.  The Nets have two legitimate NBA starters right now (maybe 2.5, as Booker can arguably start if your other four starters are excellent).  With the lack of picks, can they afford to go backwards?

 

Lopez is a very good player who actually wants to be a Net – that is something the Nets need more of, not less of.  He is a top five offensive center.  In addition, his rally from his multiple foot surgeries, and the fact that he is playing better than ever in spite of them, shows that he is an extremely hard worker who cares deeply for his craft and takes improvement seriously, despite his somewhat childish demeanor and outside interests.  Furthermore, in accepting at least two near trades away from the Nets, benchings, role changes, and personnel and coaching changes, Lopez has shown his value as a good soldier who puts the team first.

 

Indeed, much of the criticism of Lopez is grounded in the fact that he cannot be the lead player on a team.  The flaw in that criticism is that the Nets do not HAVE to make Lopez their lead piece in order to keep him.  In actuality, from the moment the Nets dealt for Deron Williams, it was never the Nets’ intent to make Lopez their lead piece – he always became their lead piece by accident due to the failings of Williams, and others.

 

It is true that by trading Lopez, the Nets can increase their asset pool somewhat.  However, this is what the Nets have at the moment in the way of picks over the next 4 years (they will regain a normal complement of picks in 2021):

 

2017: the Nets have the Celtics’ first rounder, which figures to fall, conservatively, in the 15-24 range.  In addition, if the Celtics’ second rounder is between picks 46-60, the Nets receive it (otherwise they never receive the pick): that appears unlikely as Boston is a playoff team.

 

2018: the Nets have no picks

 

2019 and 2020: the Nets have their first rounders, only

 

In short, over the next four years the Nets are out, at this moment, two lottery first rounders (provided they miss the next two playoffs, which appears likely), and four (perhaps three) second rounders.

 

Trading Lopez would replenish the cupboard, somewhat.  But it would not stock it.  Essentially, if the Nets deal Lopez, they are looking at the current roster outlook minus Lopez, and a less than normal complement of picks.  During a rebuild, the hope is to accrue extra picks, beyond what teams normally have, so that you can maximize the chances of turning assets into a star.  Dealing Lopez will not bring that, and the other veterans on the roster would be unable to bridge the gap.  Is there a point to becoming a contender, asset wise, but, unlike a contender, having the Nets current roster minus Lopez?

 

The Case For Trading Brook Lopez

 

            One key reason to deal Lopez: the lack of success the Nets had in the summer of 2016, and the summer of 2017 forecast in light of that failure.

 

For starters, there was nothing wrong with the Nets plan in the 2016 summer.  Whether it was Kent Bazemore or Marvin Williams, the Nets targeted the best unrestricted free agents that would meet with them.  The pitches simply did not work.  Williams and Bazemore chose the Hornets and Hawks because they were comfortable with their incumbent teams – and surely the chance to win more than in Brooklyn did not hurt.  Unrestricted free agents are tough to get, particularly for a bad team – they can go anywhere they want to go.  When those pitches did not work, the Nets switched gears to an easier to sign market of players – restricted free agents (RFA’s).  RFA’s are easier to sign because their incumbent teams, knowing they can match all offers, allow them to languish on the market, awaiting an offer to match.  Stars do not become RFA’s as their teams provide October deadline extensions to avoid the process, and teams are willing to allow mere starters and high end reserves to sit on the market.  Many bidders wind up scared off.  The player then looks, simply, for any bidder willing to pay them, and pressure a match (or a balk on a match).  These circumstances make it easier to sign RFA’s than unrestricted free agents, and the Nets pounced on them, properly, this summer – despite matches.  Again, one simple look at when players signed shows that the Nets, by signing Crabbe and Johnson this summer, lost out on no one – nobody significant signed as those offers were pending.

 

`           Alas, while the Nets’ strategy was correct, it still did not work, and may not work in 2017, either.  Indeed, the Rockets seem to want nothing to do with Donatas Motiejunas and the Nets still could not poach him.  Simply, teams dislike paying a player until forced to match a deal and faced with “you can pay to keep him or you lose him. History shows that teams overwhelmingly match RFA offers – the Nets ‘failure’ was no different than the typical course of events.

 

Still, the Nets’ failure must be considered in assessing the future plan.  This is a fair ranking of 2017 free agents: where do the Nets have measurable success?  Is there talent? Sure.  But also questions of who the Nets can actually get.

 

Why do Curry and Durant leave Golden State, and why would Kyle Lowry leave Toronto where he has made his career?  Why does Blake Griffin leave Los Angeles (unless he joins Russ in Oklahoma)?  CP3 figures to remain a Clipper or join a “banana boat” friend in New York or Chicago.  Does Gordon Hayward leave Utah and forego the five year max despite not being a star, and if so, does he do so not to go to a contender or to his college coach in Boston?  Does George Hill leave Utah, where he has had a big impact?  Dwyane Wade will be a Bull, Heat, or banana boat teammate next year.  Andre Iguodala and Pau Gasol will stay put or play for other winners, and Andrew Bogut too will likely latch on with a winner.  Derrick Rose seems to want to stay a Knick.  Rudy Gay is not helpful.  Rajon Rondo is hurtful.  Nobody wants Greg Monroe for a reason.  Jeff Teague is hurting the Pacers.  I cannot imagine Tony Allen leaving Memphis.  And JJ Redick will not join a high loss roster in Brooklyn.

 

Paul Millsap and Jrue Holiday may be poachable, but Millsap has established himself in Atlanta, and Holiday is arguably no upgrade over Lin given his now significant injury history. Danilo Gallinari will likely seek a payday and is no needle mover.  Taj Gibson is a nice defender but how does he move a program?  Serge Ibaka may leave Orlando but he is now on the downslide, a dangerous trend for a big. No other unrestricted free agent on the list is meaningful.

 

The RFA crowd?  That leaves Noel, Caldwell-Pope, Mirotic, Plumlee, Olynyk, Roberson, Porter, MCW, Baynes, and Burke.  Remember: the Nets would have to coax a team not to match.  Noel is intriguing, but figures to be dealt to a team that actually wants him – meaning a match would be certain.  Caldwell-Pope is a decent guard, but the Pistons like him with their young core at a position of weakness on their roster.  Mirotic is not as good as some believe, and the Bulls front office adores him.  Plumlee may be poachable, but is he worth $15 million?  And does he make the roster better with Lopez here?  Olynyk carries similar questions, and the Celtics like him.  The Thunder see Roberson as a part of their new core, and the Wizards are enjoying Porter’s growth.  As for MCW, Baynes, and Burke, is there even a point?  All three would not help the Nets, at all.

 

Some of this may sound pessimistic.  And sure, the Nets can, in theory, secure some of these players.  But the 2017 market is full of pitfalls for a 20-30 win team (in all likelihood) trying to pitch players on their program.

 

That leads to a key question.  If 2017 is another summer of marginally adding youth, and a small piece here or there to build with, can the Nets afford to waste another season losing with Lopez?  After all, if the Nets continue losing, Lopez is only going to get older.  He will not be 28 forever.  If Lopez leaves the Nets in 2 years or so in free agency without reaching the playoffs, then the Nets will have wasted Lopez’s value.  There are only two ways to secure value from Lopez at this point: building playoff teams with him as a key piece, or dealing him for future considerations.  If the Nets fail in free agency, lose around Lopez, and eventually see Lopez walk, that is the ultimate worst case scenario.

 

In addition, if the Nets stall on a Lopez trade, they risk losing value.  Playing his best basketball ever, with two full years on his contract, Lopez is arguably at his highest possible trade value, now.  With less years on his deal, and more age on his body, Lopez’s value decreases – it is hard to see the Nets finding a more optimal time to deal Lopez than this deadline.  And it is critical to deal players at their optimal value point.  Remember: Michael Carter Williams went from fetching a top 5 draft pick to fetching Tony Snell in short order.  Trade value changes – and how can Lopez’s rise from its current point?

 

The Conclusion?

 

Given the above, I believe the Nets should deal Brook Lopez this deadline.  The short term will be painful, but the Nets would finally be on the way toward building a roster the patient way.  The overwhelming Nets reality is that they cannot contend until at LEAST (in a perfect world) 2-3 years from now, when Lopez will be 31 and perhaps on the decline.  The Nets will maximize his value by dealing him now, at peak value, rather than seeing him exert prime years for a losing franchise for 2-3 years, and then letting him walk or dealing him for less in return.

 

So, What is the Market for Lopez

 

            The Nets’ inability to deal Lopez to date has not been due to his value, but due to, frankly, unforeseen circumstances.  The Thunder cringe at the unrestricted free agency market, so they avoided Lopez’s unrestricted free agency by dealing for restricted free agency controlled Enes Kanter in 2015 (despite what some fans say, that trade was never about choosing Kanter over Lopez, all things equal – it was a CBA move).  In addition, the Nets’ closeness at a Dwight deal, to the point that Dwight told friends and players he was going to Brooklyn, shows that the Nets had him in their plans – that deal also broke down by fluke.

 

Lopez has value.  However, with multiple teams set at center, who may want him.  Let’s explore a host of potential trades.

 

The “you can’t be serious” division: Brook, Bojan, LeVert, and RHJ, for DeMarcus Cousins and Anthony Tolliver.

 

If the Kings deal Cousins because of his attitude and potential he will leave in 2018, they should try to get picks and kids in return.  To trade for a “compete now” piece in Lopez would be stupid. Alas, this is the Kings, and perhaps the thought for the dysfunctional franchise is more “save face” and less “do the right thing even if it’s unpopular.” The idea: we will be awful anyway, let’s at least be splashy and sell some tickets.

 

This trade would be a big risk for the Nets, in dealing much of their bare infrastructure for a player who can bolt in 1.5 seasons. In addition, dealing for a surly star talent hitting free agency without any assurances reeks of the Deron Williams trade – without the flexibility to stuff the roster to keep him that was there in 2011.  Furthermore, Cousins’ attitude problem has become out of control, and there is no reason to believe that would change in Brooklyn – perhaps a team with an established culture can ground him, but can a team with nothing in house like the Nets?  The likelihood that the Nets continue to lose and Cousins expresses unhappiness about that would be significant  — Cousins has not approached winning in Sacramento with more talent.  And if Cousins left for greener pastures in 2018, the Nets will have set back this prolonged rebuild even further.

 

At the same time, there is no path right now to a talent of Cousins’ caliber. Perhaps that would justify this risk (although I disagree).

 

I doubt the Kings would make this trade.  From their perspective, this would be a terrible trade.  But I do not trust the Kings to act in their best interest, and that’s why this trade made the list.

 

The “take advantage of a GM maybe needing to save his job” division: Lopez for Brandon Knight, Marquese Chriss, Tyson Chandler, and a 2018 first rounder.

 

Ryan McDonough has escaped the microscope in Phoenix, perhaps until now.  After a 48-34 rousing success in 2013-2014, the Suns have done nothing but tread downhill.  The Isaiah Thomas signing was a disaster because McDonough failed to capture the human element that three point guards playing together would become combustible and antagonistic, each believing they should lead, regardless of what the analytics may have said.  Then he ruined the team’s relationship with Goran Dragic.  Then he blamed the team’s failures on Jeff Hornacek.  Then he – in an under discussed possible sign of desperation – dealt the valuable potential top 5 Lakers pick for Brandon Knight.  You only get to hire so many coaches and lose for so many years before you as the GM are seen as the problem.

 

Lopez makes little sense for the Suns’ timeline given their roster.  And perhaps McDonough’s job is not in jeopardy.  But if it is, a GM in job survival mode will typically put self preservation over the interests of the franchise.

 

The Suns could spin this trade as turning Knight – who has fallen out of favor – and a bad contract in Chandler, into a legitimate starting center who can pair with Eric Bledsoe, Devin Booker, and TJ Warren going forward.  The Nets would be getting another competent point guard, and a look at two young assets.  Given the cap spike and lack of free agent interest in the Nets, the haul would be worth taking on Chandler’s contract.

 

The “this feels like fair value” division:

 

Lopez for Asik, Ajinca, Hield, and a 2018 first round pick.

 

The Nets would be getting the sixth pick in the 2016 NBA draft in Buddy Hield, and, by getting a first round pick in 2018, would be adding to their stable of youth.  Asik and Ajinca are bad contracts, but the cap spike renders their contracts less brutal, and they can provide semi serviceable play.

 

As for the Pelicans, when you have a star the clock is ticking and Anthony Davis will eventually develop wandering eye if the losing keeps up. The Pelicans would be sacrificing youthful assets to add a win now piece, but they do need to think about how to build a roster sooner rather than later to make sure Davis sticks around.

 

 

Lopez for Dunn, Muhammad, and Pekovic, or for Rubio, Mohammed, and a 2017 first round pick.

 

The rumblings that Tom Thibodeau (as coach and GM) will try to accelerate the Wolves’ timetable are constant.  If Thibodeau believes he can employ Lopez in his defense, he would potentially have interest in him, as a center next to Karl Anthony Towns and in front of Gorgui Dieng.

 

In the first package, the Nets would be getting a rookie just picked top five in the draft, and a look at Shabazz Muhamad before deciding whether to pay him.  In the second package, the Nets would be adding a point guard to a team desperately needing better guard play, also looking at Muhammad, and getting Minnesota’s first rounder, which will likely fall in the top 5-10.

 

 

Lopez for Clarkson, Mozgov, and either a 2021 first rounder, Ivan Zubac, or a 2017 second rounder.

 

            The Lakers future vision is becoming clear under Luke Walton.  It is true that Clarkson is a part of it.  However, it is also true that Russell and Randle are seen as their two cornerstones, above Clarkson in that regard.

 

The Lakers signed Mozgov to bring a high character player who is well liked, and who can bring professionalism.  Lopez can do that, as a much better player for the Lakers, and he can serve as a core piece in a manner that Mozgov clearly cannot.  Clarkson is a talent, but as a scoring combo guard, the Lakers can find another on the market.

 

Moving on Clarkson would give the Nets a younger player to place next to their core, and Mozgov would provide coverage up front. The problem with the Lakers is past deals have ravaged their assets – the first available first rounder is in 2021.  And if a first rounder does not come with Clarkson and Mozgov, is there much of a purpose to the deal?

 

 

Lopez for Sam Dekker, 2017 first, Trevor Ariza, Corey Brewer, and KJ McDaniels

           

            In what was a buried note in a great Zach Lowe column, it appears that owner Leslie Alexander meddled in Daryl Morey’s free agency last summer by assuming a larger role in the process, in an effort to improve his roster.  The sourced report is no surprise – Morey has been notorious for sitting, deliberately, prioritizing space and assets over player acquisition, unless the acquisition is a star.  Morey has been allergic to spending on non stars – until the Rockets suddenly splurged on role players this past summer in Ryan Anderson and Eric Gordon.  Those feel like Alexander moves, and do not fit Morey’s GM profile.

 

How does that relate to the Nets?  If Alexander is putting a premium on winning now, Lopez could provide an upgrade over Clint Capela at center.  The Nets, for dealing him, would pick up two decent young assets in Dekker and the talented Rockets’ first, and a third speculative young asset in KJ McDaniels.  This trade has many component parts, but that is the only way to make the money work here.

 

 

Lopez for Monroe and Thon Maker, or Monroe, Rishad Vaughn, and a 2017 first rounder.

           

            Jason Kidd tried to bring Lopez with him to Milwaukee.  The Bucks are trying to dump Monroe, and they would be glad to turn him into Lopez.  In the first package, the Nets would get a shot at evaluating lottery pick Thon Maker, while getting Monroe for the present.  In the second package, the Nets would get last year’s 17^th pick, and another pick likely to fall in that range, in addition to adding Monroe.

 

 

Lopez for Amir Johnson, Jaylen Brown, and Boston’s 2018 first rounder

 

            Lopez does not rebound much but presumably would help Boston’s rebounding if they slotted Horford to the 4 to play alongside him.  In addition, Boston has a great motion offense, and a motion offense can always find a way to get the ball to a great scoring center.  Finally, the Celtics have continued to hold their assets for a star, but the availability of a star for the foreseeable future is unclear, unless the Celtics are willing to take a risk on Cousins (who himself may not be available).

 

Boston, by making this trade, would keep the Nets’ valuable 2017 and 2018 picks in their war chest for another move, yet would still upgrade their roster succinctly in the short term.  The Nets, for their troubles, would receive the third pick in this year’s draft, and a first rounder that figures to fall in the 18-24 range.

 

 

THE FOLLOWING FRANCHISES DID NOT MAKE THE “LOPEZ TRADE” LIST

 

The “we’re set at center, thanks for playing” crowd: Atlanta (Dwight), Denver (Jokic), Detroit (Drummond), Indiana (Turner), Los Angeles Clippers (Jordan), Memphis (Gasol), Miami (Whiteside), Orlando (Vucevic Biyombo and Ibaka), Philadelphia (Embiid and a logjam), San Antonio (Gasol and Aldridge), Utah (Gobert)
The little to trade division: Charlotte (Kaminsky), Chicago (Lopez, with little in the way of tradeable pieces), Cleveland (little to trade, and who can forget LeBron believing Brandon Jennings was better than Lopez), Dallas (little to trade, and Lopez makes no sense given the impending rebuild), Golden State (nothing to trade, and cap strapped to keep Durant given lack of bird rights), New York (nothing to deal in return), Oklahoma City (they passed on Lopez in 2015 out of being allergic to free agency, and that was before losing Durant to the process and paying Adams), Portland (no sensible deals), Toronto (no sensible deals), Washington (significant money tied into Gortat and Mahinmi)