Monthly Archives: May 2015

The Nets offseason continues to march on.  Will Deron Williams finally be gone? Is Joe Johnson traded to a contender for multiple parts? Are Brook Lopez and Thaddeus Young back next year? We can guess the answers to these questions but will not get answers for some time.

In the meantime, as the Nets chart their course to try to get back to contention, they should look to the contenders above them, and learn from those teams’ smart decisions.

Today’s review? The Houston Rockets.

Lesson One: Spread the Floor for Threes

The phrase “you live by the three, you die by the three” has become overused.  Perhaps in the past, when the league was run by elite post play, and teams lacking such elite threats hoped to take those bigs down with random hot streaks from 3, the phrase had utility.  But today, it does not hold that type of water.  The best teams in the league attack, using guards and smaller forwards, off the dribble.  By creating holes in the defense, and forcing teams to rotate off the 3 point arc, they set up open 3’s (which is really no different than a big creating open 3’s when he draws a double inside: the only difference is the method, not the result).

Overall, the idea a team is a “jump shooting team” that cannot win in the playoffs because it takes threes? Remember when the Warriors were that two weeks ago? If a team built around an elite center produces open 3’s and that’s praised as “playing inside outside,” why aren’t threes created by dribble penetration called that?

Houston led the league this season, taking 32.7 threes per game.  That did not stop them from going 56-26, getting through a playoff bracket that includes the Clippers and Spurs, and winning a division that includes the Spurs, Grizzlies, and Mavericks.  Houston is a great team, or at a minimum, a very very good one, and are better than any Nets team since 2003.

Wide open threes are great shots, and Houston excels at creating them using James Harden as the fulcrum of their pick and roll attack.  15.5% of Houston’s shots this year were three pointers with no defender within 6 feet (“wide open” shots), a figure which ranks second in the league, according to NBA.com’s stats page. To add to that, 15.9% of their shots were threes with no defender within 4 feet (“open” shots), a figure leading the league per NBA.com’s stats page.

The implications:  wide open threes are great shots, and Houston is extremely efficient at creating them.  The NBA’s best offense (per NBA.com stats), the Clippers, scored 1.098 points per possession this season.  It’s 10th best offense, the Bulls, scored 1.047 points per possession.

The Nets? They shot 35.6% on wide open 3’s this season, a figure which itself would have generated the league’s 6th best offense, but only ranked 21st in generating these looks.  The top 8 teams at generating wide open threes? The Hawks, Rockets, Clippers, Blazers, Warriors, Spurs, Sixers, and Cavs.  The bottom 8? The Lakers, Timberwolves, Wizards, Knicks, Grizzlies, Hornets, Nuggets, and Pacers.  The correlation those numbers display between the creation of wide open 3’s, and the production of wins, is clear (sure, the Sixers, Grizzlies, and Wizards are anamolies, but one of those teams has two elite post players in a league with maybe ten of those players, one was criticized all year for its antiquated offense, and one is the Sixers).

The Rockets were successful all year, and in the playoffs, because of their three point attack.  With Harden creating up top, forcing defenses to send two players at him (at least) to play his stepback and drive, and to guard the roll man off his pick and rolls, that created constant daylight for shooters.  That daylight made the Rockets’ attack sustainable no matter the injuries suffered: the attack always was Harden at the top, a roll man capable of finishing, shooters spacing the floor, and good defensive team concepts on the other end.  Whoever went down, the crux of the formula was always in place.  Was it boring? Probably, but it was also successful.

What can the Nets learn from the Rockets? Look to acquire players who can create space for shooters off the dribble drive, and surround that attack with shooters who can hit their open shots.  The Nets have some of the latter, but none of the former.

LESSON TWO: YOU CAN BECOME A CONTENDER WITHOUT TANKING

Sam Hinkie has succeeded in making 2013 the era of “is tanking moral” and “do teams tank too much because they need to in order to win.”

One issue the Nets have in their rebuild (or reconstruct): they cannot tank.  With their picks through 2018 either out of their possession, or being swapped with other franchises, the Nets cannot decide to bottom out and draft star talent in the lottery to make their way to the top. They have to rebuild from the middle.

The Rockets? While Daryl Morey and Billy King are certainly different people (in their valuing of picks, approach to analytics, etc), the Rockets do serve as a model for rebuilding from the middle. Like the Nets (albeit at a higher, less hopeless level), the Rockets, upon the underwhelming McGrady-Yao era (relative to expectation), switched gears and looked to become flexible to build around a new core.  But in doing that, this was their record by season:

-2009-2010: 42-40

-2010-2011: 43-39

-2011-2012: 34-32

-2012-2013 (year 1 with Harden); 45-37

Then, from there, Houston took off into 54-56 win territory.  Still, look at those records.  Houston got Harden and Howard, but they never bottomed out. They hung around as a mediocre, lottery franchise, on the supposed “treadmill of mediocrity.” But they did it with flexibility, such that if a chance to leave the treadmill came about, they could pounce on that chance.  They eventually did with the Harden trade, and that trade led to Dwight wanting to be a Rocket, which led to the stable of veterans around them deciding to partake in things.

The Nets surely are unlikely to get players of either star’s caliber: surely not this summer, and perhaps not next summer either.  However, the Nets in the summer of 2016 will be similar to the Rockets in 2010: they will be a mediocre team, with flexibility.  There is nothing wrong with retaining that flexibility until the right opportunity comes about, being mediocre for a little while, as the Rockets did for three years (and they were prepared for a 4th, they did not get Harden until Halloween, on the eve of 2012-2013, a player acquisition like that, at that time, is unprecedented), biding their time as a mediocre team until the chance for franchise changing talent presents itself, all the while not falling into the lottery (which the pick situation renders hopeless).

The Rockets were contend with spinning assets into assets, trekking along with decent talent until better talent became available to them. There is nothing wrong with the Nets, if 2016 does not bring Durant or some other star, taking a similar course of action.

LESSON 3: WHEN THE PLAN DOES NOT GO AS PLANNED, SWITCH GEARS

Daryl Morey is the master of this, and this is an area where Brooklyn flat out needs to be better.  In 2010, the Rockets decided, like the Nets and others, that it was time to use that summer to build a champion.  When rebuffed by Chris Bosh and others, they did not panic sign plan B type talent just to say they did something, but they switched gears, largely keeping their team intact in the hopes of doing something grand in another year. The Nets do NOT need to overpay B level talent in 2016 if they strike out on the A class talent, just to say they did something.

More notable was 2012, and this past summer in Houston. In 2012, the Rockets were dead set on acquiring Dwight. He rejected them.  So rather than panic add a plan B, they totally shifted gears, dealing Kyle Lowry for a lottery pick and allowing Goran Dragic to walk to acquire flexibility. The Rockets quite literally went from shooting for 55 wins, to trying to bottom out, because of a change in the market. Their plan shifted gears.  This is oft forgotten because of the Harden trade in 2012, but that was a fluke (a fluke the Lowry deal helped, as that pick was added to the Harden package).

Then this summer, the Rockets nearly acquired Bosh, knowing full well a Harden-Dwight-Bosh-Parsons core could win 60 games (another note: Bosh and Dwight went from disinterested in Houston, to very much interested: the Nets should not worry if free agents rebuff their advances; by creating a winner you change the perception).

What happened when Bosh chose to stay in Miami? Morey shifted gears: he then decided it did NOT make sense to keep Parsons. It was one thing to lose future flexibility when adding Bosh to form that quartet. The creation of a juggernaut justifies throwing away flexibility? To lose it just to keep Parsons? Suddenly, you have locked yourself into a limited ceiling. Morey then said goodbye to Parsons, and acquired Ariza and others on more flexibility friendly deals.

The Nets do not shift gears enough. The Boston trade? If Deron was the Utah Deron, or if his name was Chris Paul, that trade, in all sincerity, would have been smart. It would have nuked the future, but when an opportunity to create an elite contender comes to you, that’s an ok price you pay.  Once Deron’s body betrayed him, the Nets should have shifted gears and went another way.

And in 2016, if the Nets fail to score their targets, they should not panic add lesser targets just to sell some merchandise. Shift gears and go in another direction.

The Nets can learn a lot from a 56 win team in the conference finals in the Houston Rockets.  Will they?

The Brooklyn Nets have officially settled into their offseason. And needless to say, it is a critical one.  Brook Lopez and Thaddeus Young are free agents.  The Nets want to spend in 2016. But they want to pay Lopez and Young. They have $45 million (approximately) invested in a backcourt they do not want. The Nets want 2016 fireworks but face 2015 conflict and questions.

Clearly, things have not gone to plan for the Nets in Brooklyn. But, remember.  The Cavaliers were a 33-49 mess just last year, the Warriors a lottery team in 2012, the Rockets a middling team seen as incapable of grabbing stars in 2012.  Fortunes can change, and change quickly.  Do the Nets do not have a developing Steph Curry, the hope the league’s best player is a Brooklynite, or the asset trove Houston used to trade for James Harden? No.  But, there are still pages the Nets can take from the books of the teams that have gone further than them this year, in the hopes they can do something similar three years down the line.

This piece takes on the Warriors.

Sports VU: Per NBA.com Stats, the Warriors led the NBA in shots taken where the ball handler had the ball for just 0-2 seconds.

When the Warriors play, the ball move.  Not just that, the players move.  Players set screens.  Steph Curry and Klay Thompson run around those screens.  The defense is forced to constantly rotate.  As shown by this stat, when players get the ball, they do not hold it. They make quick decisions: I will shoot this jumper, or I will pass, or I will dribble and get to the rim.

The NBA loves the narrative of its being a “superstar league.” And without a doubt, Curry is a superstar.  But so is Russell Westbrook, and the Thunder are a lottery team.  The Warriors only have one superstar.  46% of Thompson’s shots this season came without a single dribble: he is a very good player, but is not a creator of offense for others. Rather, he is a tool who enhances the offense with his catch and shoot ability (and good, but not great, ability to make plays off the bounce).  Draymond Green? He takes even more of his shots as a catch and shoot or quick hitter option, rather than making plays off the dribble for himself.

The Warriors are proof, as talented as you are, that multiple superstars are not a necessity offensively.  Everyone in Golden State is good, there is no doubt.  But Curry is the only superstar on the team, which is a team full of talent, but only one top 15-25 player.

Perhaps more importantly, the Warriors are filled with skilled passers, an underrated asset on a contender.  Curry, Thompson, Green, and Bogut are all plus passers at their positions.  Passing, notably, is a skill not seen in the box score, so finding talented passers among the league’s fringe players could be an exploitable market inefficiency for Brooklyn.

The Nets, if they can build a roster of players who can shoot, pass, and while are not superstars, are good enough to attack the openings and gaps created by a team oriented offense like Golden State’s, can turn their fortunes.

The Eye Test: Defensive Versatility is Huge in the Modern NBA; the Warriors Have it and the Nets Don’t

Commonly, defense is associated with big men.  However, the modern NBA is not built around the behemoth bigs of the 1980’s and 1990’s.  The centers remaining in the playoffs: “undersized” (Horford), “clutsy” (Mozgov), elite but playing injured (Dwight), and a once “bust” at number one overall (Bogut).

Yes, rim protection is important.  But the single most important thing to an NBA team defensively is the ability of multiple players to guard multiple positions.  The dribble drive and pick and roll is a staple of any good NBA offense: the constant switching makes it imperative for players to … switch.  You are at a disadvantage defensively if a player cannot switch onto another position.

The best defenses are built around the ability to guard multiple positions, and you can begin to build a contender by acquiring players who can do just that.  The Warriors have Draymond Green, Shaun Livingston, Andrew Bogut, Andre Iguodala, and Klay Thompson are all plus defenders, who guard multiple positions.  It allows Golden State to switch seamlessly. Let a 4 guard a 2. Let a 3 guard a 5.  That second the offense loses when you switch is the difference between shooting a gap, and closing the gap.  Even the 2013-2014 Nets carved a decent defense together — an old team in a young, fast league — because in Livingston, Paul Pierce, and Joe Johnson at similar sizes, they had developed some of that interchangeable personnel defensively.

The Nets should look into acquiring players who can guard multiple positions.  The size of the names does not matter: there are many nondescript names in these conference finals as bigger names watch from home.

Roster Building: Forget What the Fans Say and Don’t Do it All At Once

It seems that the 2010 summer in Miami has created the idea among fans — and among a few too many organizations (ahem, Nets), that the way to build a team is simple: open cap space, enter free agency, sign a bunch of superstars, and you’re in!

It’s not that simple.  A look at all of the teams remaining in the playoffs, particularly the Warriors, show that there is no real need to acquire a superstar in free agency in order to build a contender.  Taking LeBron’s teams out of the equation, look at how the contenders of recent seasons have built: primarily through drafting their personnel, using assets in deals, and smart and selective free agency signings (as opposed to the bigger signings).

Take a look at how the Warriors were built:

2009: they drafted Curry.

2010: they signed David Lee. Ironically, the one time they decided “let’s open up cap space and sign a big name” resulted in the roster’s lone albatross.

2011: they drafted Thompson

2011-2012: they traded Monta Ellis for Andrew Bogut-more on that below

2012: they drafted Harrison Barnes and Draymond Green.  This is a note that all draft picks matter. Sure, many second rounders flame out. But if you hit paydirt, you can get an excellent, supremely cost controlled piece

2013: they sign and traded for Marreese Speights and Andre Iguodala. Yes, that was a large free agency strike. But it came after the methodical building of a roster, ground up.  It came after patience. It was a supplement to a core, rather than trying to build an entire core through free agency.

2014: they signed Livingston and Leandro Barbosa.  Again, free agency was used as a tool to round out a core, not completely built from ruins.

The takeaways.  Sure, one obvious one is that the idea contenders do not draft their talent is totally false: Curry, Thompson, Green, and Barnes were drafted by the Warriors, and Bogut was acquired for Ellis, whom they drafted.

But the other takeaway are what matter to the Nets almost as much.  The Warriors did not enter a summer and decide, “we have to make a splash. We have to sign a superstar.”  They built the methodical way, rather than fixating on stars.  They essentially added 1-2 rotation pieces a year, until they got the pieces they wanted. There is no mandate that the Nets have to sign Durant in 2016. Sure: it would be nice. But it is not mandated.

Rather than heading into free agency with no talent (allowing Brook and Young to walk for cap room, etc) and saying “we can have all the stars”!, the Nets should be patient. Keep Lopez. Keep Young. Keep Bogdanovic.  Maybe even resign Johnson in 2016 to a much smaller deal than his current one (maybe), if it makes sense.  Durant says no to Brooklyn? (it’s highly unlikely he signs here). Add a free agent, maybe 2, that fit the core. You need athletes? Add athletes. You need a point guard. Add an affordable, sensible point guard with quickness that the roster lacks.  It will not make a splash. It will not win free agency.

But guess what. The Warriors entered the 2010 sweepstakes and got David Lee. They entered the Dwight sweepstakes and lost to Houston. They entered the Kevin Love sweepstakes and lost to Cleveland. It doesn’t matter who wins the headline, or the free agent sweepstakes. The Warriors are 67-15 and 2 games from the finals. You can have your headlines.

The Bogut-Ellis trade. That is a reminder to the Nets: do NOT worry about what the fans want this summer or in 2016. Do not shape personnel decisions around fan desires, what will sell the most merchandise, or what is easiest to package to fans in a season ticket renewal package. Just consider one issue: what move is best for us in our goal to build a sustainable winner.  Warriors fans booed Joe Lacob off stage when he traded Ellis for Bogut. Ellis was a huge fan favorite.  He also took grief for that matter when he fired Mark Jackson.

Funny. I don’t see any of the complaining Warriors fans of 2012 and 2014 complaining now.

Can the Nets replicate what the Warriors have done? Probably not.  But they can learn from their focus on multiple willing passers who guard multiple positions, and their prioritization of methodical, piece by piece roster building over one huge summer strike.

The Brooklyn Nets Offseason has officially begun, and here is a basic outline.

Nets Under Contract: Deron, Joe, Jack, Bojan, Karasev, Plumlee

Free Agents: Brook (player option), Thad (player option), Mirza (restricted free agent), Anderson (player option), Markel (team option), Jefferson (team option), Jordan (restricted free agent), Clark (team option), Morris (team option).

Cap Space: $7.7 million, but only if every single free agent was renounced, and left.  If one of Brook or Thad stays, the Nets have no cap space.  So, in short, the Nets will likely be limited to cap exceptions and minimum salaries on the trade market.  Beyond that, the primary resource for improvement this summer: the draft, and the trade market.

The questions: 

–The free agent bigs: If Brook or Thad opt in, they become unrestricted 2016 free agents. If they opt out, do the Nets keep them, and at what number? My take? Brook opts out and negotiates a 4 year deal, Thad opts in.

–Deron, Joe, and Jack: 3 of the 6 Nets under contract are young. And then there are Deron, Joe, and Jack. Do the Nets shop one or all of them? Can they even be shopped, given their contracts and the market’s desire for flexibility and guards who are quick off the dribble? My take? All 3 are shopped at least quietly, but only Joe is moved successfully.

–The role player free agents: Do the Nets look to bring back Mirza and Anderson as role playing parts to a pseudo competitive team? Or, in trying to go younger, do they eschew complementary parts? What is the price tag on either player? My take? Both players are goners.

–Who made a name for himself: Markel, Jefferson, Clark, Jordan, and Morris are the other free agents, and in each case, the Nets essentially can retain the player if they wish. Which youngster showed enough for the Nets to decide to bring back? Which youngster is seen as dead weight at the bottom of the bench? My take: Markel and Jefferson are readily brought back, Morris is not, and Clark and Jordan are not reflexively retained, but will sit in limbo.